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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In July 2009, the Southern Hemisphere completely banned nuclear weapons as the 
Pelindaba Treaty entered into force in Africa.  The Pelindaba Treaty and others like it are 
available options for states to cooperate with each other on the issue of denuclearization 
through security regimes.  However, treaties like this also require the support and 
cooperation of states which possess nuclear weapons to be truly effective because “the 
policies of cooperation that will bring mutual rewards if others cooperate may bring 
disaster if they do not” (Jervis 1978: 167).  While I focus on the US responses to these 
security regimes, this thesis also touches on the more general question of whether or not 
cooperation is possible amongst states.  Out of the five regions (Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia) that have 
attempted to prohibit the possession or use of nuclear weapons, the US has only fully 
supported the Latin America and Caribbean Nuclear Weapons Free Zone by both signing 
and ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco.  The US has also given some initial support to two 
others by signing the treaties in the South Pacific and Africa.  So, my research question is 
what factors affect the inconsistent US response to nuclear weapons free zone treaties?
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The UN definition of a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) and the obligations of nuclear 
weapons states (NWS) toward the states within these denuclearized zones are defined as:   
 
“any zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercise of their 
sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty of convention whereby: 
(a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall 
be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is 
defined; (b) An international system of verification and control is 
established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from 
that statute.” (UN General Assembly 1975, Res3472B (XXX)) 
 
The UN General Assembly suggests that obligations of the NWS should be to respect the 
treaty or convention which establishes the NWFZ and not to use or threaten to use 
nuclear weapons against those states within the NWFZ. 
 
The existing literature does not directly answer my question, so to explain how the US 
addresses this particular type of security regime, I must start at the beginning.  First, 
working within the neorealist assumptions that states are ultimately security seekers and 
cooperation is difficult to achieve, I examine why states would want to build nuclear 
weapons.  I explain the security dilemma and deterrence, follow that with other 
explanations of proliferation, and then discuss why some particular states see it in their 
interests to ban these weapons through security regimes and other arms control methods 
such as the nonproliferation treaty and NWFZs. 
 
The former Delegate from Guam to the US House of Representatives, Ben Blaz (1987) 
outlined a list of seven criteria that the US uses to evaluate their acceptance of a NWFZ 
treaty, though this list of criteria does not effectively answer my research question either.  
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So I develop three additional factors, with the aid of Blaz’s (1987) list and Putnam’s 
(1988) explanation of two-level games in international negotiations, that I believe may be 
the most important factors to explain the US responses to these treaties.  I find that one of 
these factors, based on the US relationship with the Soviet Union (and later Russia) has 
the most support overall.  My other two additional factors include the treaties’ 
relationships to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as well as to the parties that control 
the American Presidency and Senate.  I also test four factors from Blaz’s (1987) list that I 
think are of equal importance.  This suggests that there may be certain factors that 
regional denuclearization movements, and more broadly, international actors seeking to 
create security regimes through cooperation, should focus on in order to successfully 
draw support from major players in the system. 
 
To test my theory that these three additional factors are important, I use a structured, 
focused comparison to evaluate the US response to three NWFZs: Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the South Pacific, and Africa. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
As I mentioned above, there is not much existing literature that focuses broadly on the 
issue of NWFZs or the responses of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS).  Many studies that 
focus on the topic of nuclear weapons free zones do so in the context of one particular 
region which I will illustrate in the last section of this chapter.  Therefore, the 
examination of US responses to NWFZs rests first in the introduction of the broad 
context of cooperation.  Then the focus turns to deterrence and the security dilemma, 
which then leads to proliferation pressures. Proliferation leads to arms control through 
cooperative security regimes, which includes the nonproliferation regime and the NWFZ 
agreements.  My research contributes to the existing literature by looking at the broad 
topic of NWFZs as opposed to focusing on a single agreement by comparing three of the 
agreements.   
 
Cooperation is defined as occurring “when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or 
anticipated preferences of others” (Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 226).  Is cooperation 
possible for security seekers, specifically within the nuclear context?  As an effort at 
security through cooperation, Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) agreements can be  
 5
difficult to achieve due to the cooperation challenges and problems that arise as 
proliferation spreads.  Such concerns could be an underlying issue as to why the US may 
be hesitant to accede to such agreements, even though the US is generally supportive of 
controlling proliferation.  One of the challenges in these types of cooperative agreements 
is the two-level game described by Putnam (1988).  This two-level game describes the 
interaction of domestic politics and diplomacy, creating a two stage process of 
negotiating treaties like these NWFZ agreements.  The first stage of this process is the 
negotiation stage at the international level and the second is the ratification process at the 
national level (Putnam 1988).  For these NWFZ agreements, since the US has signed 
most of them but has only ratified one, the problem of inconsistent responses may lie 
within the second stage of the process.  Looking into the security dilemma and deterrence 
literature can illustrate how the cycle begins, from the need to acquire nuclear weapons to 
the first stage of the two-level game, cooperating to create a security agreement. 
 
 
Deterrence and the Security Dilemma 
 
 
To understand attitudes toward NWFZs, one must understand the reasons why states 
pursue nuclear weapons in the first place.  There are three major debates identified in the 
deterrence and security dilemma literature.  The first general theme involves how states 
and state relationships are affected by the security dilemma.  The other two debates are 
centered on nuclear weapons.  The questions within these other two debates include: what 
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is the role of nuclear weapons in the security dilemma and are nuclear weapons effective 
in deterring armed conflict?  The neorealist literature implies that states in the 
international system are ultimately security seekers, so these questions are important in 
identifying measures to achieve cooperation and prevent states from actually using 
nuclear weapons. 
 
The security dilemma makes cooperation difficult.  Jervis (1978:169) defines the security 
dilemma as a problem which develops because “many of the means by which a state tries 
to increase its security decrease the security of others.”  Jervis (1978) suggests solutions 
to this problem, but others, like Glaser (1997) and Schweller (1996) are critical of his 
assumptions.  Jervis (1978) argues that weapons can be differentiated into offensive and 
defensive uses.  He proposes that the most stable situation would be a world where 
defense has the advantage and when defensive and offensive weapons are 
distinguishable.  This would then make the world safer by significantly lowering the 
chance of creating security problems.  Glaser (1997: 194) argues that not all states are 
security seekers, because some states are just greedy, so “the importance of the security 
dilemma for both explanation and prediction decreases when one or more of the major 
powers is a greedy state.”  Focusing mostly on the work of neorealist Kenneth Waltz, 
Schweller (1996) also makes a similar argument.  He argues that Waltz is inconsistent 
with the realist approach because of the assumption that states are security seekers 
instead of power seekers; that there is a neorealist bias toward the status quo, overlooking 
“the importance of revisionist goals (nonsecurity expansion) as the driving force” 
(Schweller 1996: 92).  Another criticism from Glaser (1997) is that many weapons can be 
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used for both offensive and defensive purposes, so the variation in weapons may not 
always be present, as Jervis (1978) had suggested.  If this is true, Jervis’s proposed plan 
of escaping the security dilemma will not always work. 
 
Jervis (1978: 198) admits that, “concerning nuclear weapons, it is generally agreed that 
defense is impossible—a triumph not of the offense, but of deterrence,” which is one 
reason why states pursue the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons.  Roth 
(2007) outlines the arguments of Waltz and Mearsheimer about the role of nuclear 
weapons.  For Waltz, nuclear weapons prevent any armed conflict between nuclear 
powers because the costs are too high because even a conventional war can lead to 
“inadvertent escalation” and the use of nuclear weapons (Roth 2007: 372).  At one point, 
Mearsheimer (1990) expresses similar beliefs about the stabilizing power of nuclear 
weapons, arguing that limited nuclear proliferation would help keep Europe stable after 
the Cold War, but more recently has argued “that possession of nuclear weapons alone is 
neither an absolute deterrent nor a guarantee of security” (Roth 2007: 379).  The 
argument is that if states realize that they cannot risk actually using nuclear weapons, 
they will become confident that a conventional war will not become nuclear (Roth 2007: 
378).  But is deterrence an effective strategy?  Brown and Deutch (2007: np) argue that as 
a deterrent, nuclear weapons are still valuable to US security and international stability.  
However, a group of former high US officials, Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn (2007: 
np), believe that “deterrence is decreasingly effective and increasingly hazardous,” 
especially that which is based on the obsolete Cold War era Mutually Assured 
Destruction (MAD) strategy. 
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In an international system in where states do not cooperate freely, the literature suggests 
that in order to escape the fear of the security dilemma, states must find a way to stabilize 
the international system by scaring others to force them to cooperate.  Here, cooperation 
becomes important because if states within the security dilemma choose not to cooperate, 
another problem is that spiral arms races could emerge (Jervis 1976).  One avenue to 
force cooperation is through nuclear deterrence, as long as people believe it works.  But, 
since not all states want to join the nuclear club, there must be alternative explanations of 
how states escape the security dilemma that do not involve the threat of nuclear war.  
Another way to escape the security dilemma, through cooperation, is the creation of 
NWFZs.  So, the next steps in the journey toward the development of NWFZs are 
proliferation and the creation of security regimes. 
 
 
Proliferation 
 
 
The security dilemma is one reason why states are likely to want nuclear weapons.  
Acquisition of these weapons creates cooperation problems which then leads to 
international arms control efforts.  The major theme in the proliferation literature focuses 
on why states choose to build nuclear weapons (beyond the strategy of deterrence 
discussed above) and how we may be able to predict when states are planning to develop 
nuclear weapons in the future.  The literature suggests several necessary, but not always 
sufficient, conditions which explain proliferation decisions.  These are important 
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questions to explore in an era in which many of the major powers are seeking to slow or 
halt nuclear proliferation for security reasons, specifically through NWFZs as I am 
interested in for this study.  As mentioned above, Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that 
proliferation and deterrence would be a good thing, as this could promote stability.  Waltz 
(Sagan and Waltz 1995: 42) argues that although there could never be a guarantee of 
peace from the spread of nuclear weapons, a “gradual spread of nuclear weapons is better 
than no spread or rapid spread.”  In what Roth (2007) describes as Mearsheimer’s second 
out of three distinct periods, Mearsheimer takes a similar approach to Waltz.  
Mearsheimer (1990) argues that nuclear proliferation could be a useful tool in promoting 
peace and stability in post-Cold War Europe.  He believes that proliferation and 
deterrence would be helpful with the breakdown of the bipolar structure of the system at 
the end of the Cold War.  He argues that the worst scenario would be to make Europe 
nuclear free, and the best scenario would be to “incorporate the limited, managed 
proliferation of nuclear weapons” (Mearsheimer 1990: 31).  Ideally, he believes that this 
managed proliferation should not spread further than Germany because of the possibility 
of mismanagement among smaller states.  Hoffmann (1990) and Risse-Kappen (1990) 
respond to Mearsheimer’s (1990) arguments.  Hoffmann (1990: 192) argues that there 
really is not any reason that Germany would want to acquire nuclear weapons, and that 
the superpowers and Germany’s neighbors would not likely “tolerate a nuclear Reich.”  
Risse-Kappen (1990: 219) makes a similar argument that others would want to prevent 
German proliferation because of the state’s past and that managed proliferation “would 
be bound to lead to precisely the kind of crises he wants to prevent.” 
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Sagan (Sagan and Waltz 1995) also argues against these points.  He responds to Waltz’s 
discussion and argues that more nuclear weapons could be worse.  Sagan (Sagan and 
Waltz 1995) discusses the possibilities that new nuclear states and more nuclear weapons 
could lead to accidents or nuclear terrorism, although Waltz (Sagan and Waltz 1995) 
responds that there are sufficient means to prevent accidents and nuclear weapons would 
be difficult for terrorist groups to acquire, as there are easier ways to reach their goals.  
Shultz, et al. (2007) echo Sagan’s (Sagan and Waltz 1995) point about the dangerous risk 
of mistakes that could be possible when dealing with nuclear weapons.  To help make 
their point they borrow a statement made by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger: 
“mistakes are made in every other human endeavor. Why should nuclear weapons be 
exempt?” (Shultz, et al. 2007: np).  Sugden (2008) and Brown (2007: 13) also mention 
the threat of nuclear terrorism, one of the risks of not disarming that has become more 
salient since 2001, one threat that would certainly be difficult to address if it were to 
happen because unlike other states, non-state actors are undeterrable. 
 
There are several determinants or conditions which the literature suggests would cause a 
state to decide to build nuclear weapons.  The first of these are a state’s technological 
conditions.  Singh and Way (2004: 862-863) explain that a state’s ability to acquire the 
resources needed to produce nuclear weapons is only a necessary condition of 
proliferation.  Some of the technological determinants they mention are “economic 
prosperity, literacy levels, and scientific development” (Singh and Way 2004: 862).  For 
Lavoy (2006), technological determinants become part of the third stage of the nuclear 
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mythmaking theory, which helps “mythmakers” persuade the public that nuclear weapons 
should and can be produced (Singh and Way 2004: 435). 
 
The second group of determinants includes domestic or organizational conditions.  Singh 
and Way (2004: 864) identify four domestic factors which may lead to nuclear 
proliferation: democratization, liberalization, “an autonomous domestic elite,” and status 
perceptions.  Jo and Gartzke (2007: 170-171) also examine the possibility that regime 
type or status variables may explain why some states choose to proliferate.  They 
conclude that both factors influence nuclear decisions, but only symbolic and status 
variables affect both stages of proliferation (programs and possession), while democratic 
regimes only positively affect the possession stage (Jo and Gartzke 2007: 179).  In the 
case of South Africa, Liberman (2001) argues that organizational conditions, mainly 
military dominance, drove the state to build nuclear weapons.  In Pakistan, nuclear 
weapons developed an important symbolic value which they believed would enhance 
their status (Ahmed 1999: 185). 
 
The third set of conditions involves international security and international pressure.  
This relates back to the mythmaking theory: the first stage is that there is a problem with 
the state’s security and the second stage is that nuclear weapons would be the best way to 
solve this security problem (Lavoy 2006: 435).  Singh and Way (2004: 863) also suggest 
that security threats, as well as security guarantees, can influence proliferation decisions.  
This is mirrored by Jo and Gartzke (2007: 173-174) who identify threat levels (nuclear 
and conventional), defense agreements and isolation as variables which influence a 
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state’s willingness to develop nuclear weapons.  For Pakistan, regional security was a 
contributing factor in nuclear weapons development due to the Indian nuclear threat 
(Ahmed 1999).  Liberman (2001) explains that there was a possible nuclear threat to 
South Africa because of the Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola and Namibia as well as 
a conventional regional threat, the African National Congress.  But in South Africa, 
international pressure succeeded in ending the nuclear program, whereas in India and 
Pakistan it has not, although it has been somewhat influential on certain aspects. 
 
Some suggest that there are certain advantages to nuclear proliferation, which may also 
help explain why some states build nuclear weapons.  The major advantage is deterrence, 
connecting proliferation back to the security dilemma.  Asal and Beardsley (2007: 140) 
find evidence to support the theory that “crises involving nuclear actors are more likely to 
end without violence.”  Ahmed (1999) offers an example of this advantage by looking at 
the case of Pakistan, which has had some success at developing a less violent relationship 
with India through the proliferation process.  For those states which are included in the 
second generation of nuclear powers, Hagerty (1998) suggests that some states have 
found that opaque proliferation also adds to the advantage of nuclear deterrence because 
there is a higher level of uncertainty involved.  India, Pakistan and Israel are included in 
Hagerty’s discussion of opacity. 
 
The nuclear proliferation literature does help to explain a lot of the reasons why certain 
states may choose to build nuclear weapons.  What, then, do we do when more states 
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express interest in acquiring these weapons?  Cooperation through security regimes is one 
way to address these proliferation concerns.  
 
 
Security Regimes: Arms Control and the Nonproliferation Treaty 
 
 
Security regimes and institutions could help promote cooperation so that states stay out of 
the security dilemma.  NWFZs are some examples of security regimes which could 
promote regional cooperation, as well as cooperation with the major nuclear powers.  
NWFZ agreements are also part of larger arms control efforts designed to counter 
proliferation pressures.  There were two key questions asked in the arms control 
literature.  What has been done to stop or stall nuclear proliferation and how can we make 
the nonproliferation regime stronger?  In addition to these questions, another would be 
how have global regimes affected the US response to regional agreements?  
Understanding these questions is important because with more and more states gaining 
access to the technology and materials to build nuclear weapons, it may become 
increasingly difficult to control nuclear proliferation.  The Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT) was an early attempt to form a multilateral agreement to halt proliferation.  
The NPT regime and the NWFZ treaties linked to it have become a strong focal point of 
nuclear arms control.  Because the NWFZ agreements are linked to the NPT, the strength 
of the NPT regime has an effect on how the US and other major powers respond to the 
smaller regional agreements.  The NPT defines a nuclear weapon state (NWS) as “one 
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which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive 
device prior to 1 January 1967.”  Therefore, there are only five recognized NWS (US, 
UK, France, Russia, and China) and the treaty’s goal is to keep it that way. 
 
Ayson (2001), Brown (2007) and Nye (1992) suggest some strategies to deal with the 
process of proliferation. Ayson (2001: 67) outlines three of the traditional strategies as 
“management,” which refers to arms control and the NPT regime, “abolition,” which 
refers to the pursuit of complete disarmament, and “nullification,” which he describes as 
“military counter-measures, such as missile defense systems, to cancel out the 
capabilities and threats that arise from proliferation.”  He argues that these strategies are 
not working, so we need to create new hybrid strategies that would combine these 
traditional approaches.  One such approach could be the pursuit of NWFZs, which would 
combine both management and abolition.  Brown (2007) and Nye (1992) both suggest a 
sticks and carrots approach to halting proliferation.  Nye (1992: 1297) argues that 
“traditional proliferation policy must build upon past accomplishments with four types of 
instruments: security guarantees, technical restraints, unilateral measures, and multilateral 
institutions.”  Brown (2007) argues that we should prevent transfer of weapons, 
knowledge and technology.  He also suggests two other ways to prevent proliferation.  A 
“sticks” approach would be to place sanctions on states with new or developing programs 
and trade or financial incentives, the “carrots” approach, can be added or used instead. 
 
The arms control regime created between the US and the Soviet Union was an important 
starting point to the nonproliferation regime of today and this is relevant to one aspect of 
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my theory because the struggles here between the US and the Soviet Union/Russia 
foreshadow their responses to the NWFZ agreements.  It is important to understand how 
this particular relationship developed so that we might be able to use elements from this 
regime to strengthen the current nonproliferation regime.  In explaining arms control in 
general, using realist assumptions, Jervis (1993: 239) argues that arms control can be 
linked to national security; that “if the main objective of arms control is to make war less 
likely, then any theory of arms control must rest on a theory of the causes of war.”  
Baglione (1997) reviews some of the theories which have been used to attempt to explain 
the START I agreement between the US and the Soviet Union.  She argues that a realist 
explanation would not work because the Soviets accepted regulations which would 
weaken their position in relation to the US (Baglione 1997: 136).  She also explains that 
the agreement did not develop under bureaucratic pressure on either side (Baglione 1997: 
137-138).  Her argument is that both leaders (Bush and Gorbachev) possessed a high 
level of autonomy at the time and were able to pursue their preferred strategies.  Braun 
and Chyba (2004) and Pilat (2007) argue that the nonproliferation regime under the NPT 
created between the Cold War superpowers can still be helpful.  But there must be some 
attempts to reform the regime, due to the different circumstances that now exist. 
 
Pilat (2007), Wesley (2005), and Hanson (2005) look into the future of the NPT.  Similar 
to previous arguments, Pilat (2007) claims that the US-Soviet created regime is outdated 
and insufficient to deal with the current nuclear situation.  He argues, though, that the 
current NPT regime should not be replaced but “maintained and strengthened” (Pilat 
2007: 475).  Wesley (2005) and Hanson (2005) also look into the future of the NPT.  
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Hanson (2005: 301) takes a position similar to that of Pilat (2007), arguing that there are 
some changes that should be made to the existing regime to make it more effective, as 
she believes “that there is no viable alternative to the NPT.”  Wesley (2005) makes an 
argument which seems to be quite like that of Mearsheimer (1990) at the end of the Cold 
War.  Wesley (2005: 283) argues that horizontal proliferation is inevitable and “will 
probably continue at the rate of one or two additional nuclear weapons states per decade, 
whether or not the NPT is retained.”  So his suggestion is to replace the NPT with a 
regime that is more practical; one which would govern possession and limited 
proliferation.  Hanson (2005) blames U.S. policies for the failures of the NPT regime.  In 
particular, she blames the U.S. for avoiding the disarmament goals of the NPT.  Leaver 
(2005: 424) makes a similar argument, suggesting that nuclear weapons states should 
“reinvigorate their own commitments to Article 6…a reformist project which is truly 
worthy of our time and energy.”  Here Leaver is referring to Article Six of the NPT, 
which states that “each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control” (Brown and Deutch 2007: np). 
 
The nuclear arms control literature offers insight into how the US and the Soviet Union 
created a nonproliferation regime that has survived since the end of the Cold War, but 
that the regime is beginning to crumble.  By studying the current situations, it has been 
suggested that the Nonproliferation Treaty should be reformed.  This would strengthen 
the regime and help it fit with current issues more closely.  Finding reasonable incentives 
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for nonproliferation and disarmament could be a big step toward restoring the regime.  
Continuing to expand the regime through linking it to NWFZs could also help to restore 
the nonproliferation regime. 
 
 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zones 
 
 
Nuclear weapons free zones have been identified as an important path toward 
nonproliferation and disarmament by scholars and the UN (Mukai 2005, United Nations 
General Assembly 1975).  The UN General Assembly (1975) looks more broadly at the 
NWFZ issue with Resolution 3472B (XXX).  It is within this resolution that the UN 
determines that NWFZs are one of the most effective tools for preventing both horizontal 
and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.  These zones began spreading over the 
southern hemisphere, beginning in 1959 with the Antarctic Treaty, which established that 
Antarctica could be used for peaceful purposes only.  Following that, in 1967 the Treaty 
of Tlatelolco established a NWFZ which covers all of Latin America and the Caribbean.  
In 1985, the Treaty of Rarotonga established a NWFZ in the South Pacific, excluding 
most of the northern island states and territories which are linked to the United States.  
The Bangkok Treaty of 1995 established a NWFZ in Southeast Asia, which includes 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.  The Pelindaba Treaty of 1996 established a NWFZ in 
Africa.  The most recent NWFZ was established in Central Asia in 2006.  The CANWFZ 
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covers Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  As of July 
2009, all of these NWFZs have entered into force: Antarctica in June 1961, Rarotonga in 
December 1986, Bangkok in March 1997, CANWFZ in March 2009, and Pelindaba in 
July 2009.  The Tlatelolco Treaty entered into force for each state individually as it was 
ratified and all but eight out of the 33 signatories had ratified it by the early 1980s – the 
first was Mexico in September 1967 and the last was Cuba in October 2002.  Only one of 
these, the CANWFZ, is completely outside of the southern hemisphere, so since the 
Pelindaba Treaty has entered into force, it should effectively ban nuclear weapons from 
the entire southern hemisphere (Mtimkulu 1996). 
 
An example of the literature on NWFZs, which shows that most focus on individual 
treaties, is that of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) created by the Treaty of 
Rarotonga in 1985.  Former New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange (1985) claims that 
collective security was a strategy pursued by his government on the nuclear issue.  But 
for New Zealand and the rest of the South Pacific, regional security did not mean creating 
deterrents by building nuclear weapons, but by banning nuclear weapons.  There are two 
key questions addressed in the SPNFZ literature.  Why would the states of the South 
Pacific Forum want to create a nuclear free zone?  And which of the five major nuclear 
powers supported the creation of the zone?  At first, only two (China and the Soviet 
Union) supported the treaty.  The other three (US, UK and France) finally signed the 
treaty a decade later, but the US has never ratified the treaty.  The existing literature 
discusses why these three waited so long to sign, but there is still a question remaining 
about why the United States has still failed to ratify the Treaty of Rarotonga and how it 
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may affect the SPNFZ, which I aim to address in this study.  Sagan (1996) offers three 
explanations of nuclear proliferation: the international security model, the domestic 
politics model, and the normative model.  Through applying these three models, it would 
make sense that South Pacific states have not had the need for nuclear weapons.  There 
have been no significant external military threats to the island states in the region, either 
from outside the region or even within the region.  Most causes of political instability in 
the Pacific have been intrastate.  There has been no popular support or bureaucratic desire 
for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, but there were growing anti-nuclear movements 
in the 1970s and 1980s, especially in New Zealand (Clements 1988) and French 
Polynesia (Regnault 2005).  Also, banning the weapons seems to have more of a 
symbolic contribution to autonomy and legitimacy than building them would have had 
because of their strong anti-nuclear position.  For example, the Soviet Union and China 
praised the South Pacific Forum for creating the agreement, “despite pressure from the 
United States, France, and the United Kingdom” (Regnault 2005: 349).  So why would 
these Pacific states want to ban nuclear weapons from the region since no one wanted 
them to begin with? 
 
One of the explanations for this, offered by Power (1986), Sawyer (1986), and Regnault 
(2005) is that the desire for a nuclear-free Pacific was a response to the influence and past 
exploitation by those three major colonial powers in the region, the United States, France, 
and the United Kingdom, each of which had nuclear weapons testing programs there.  
France was testing their nuclear weapons much more recently than the United States and 
the United Kingdom, so much of the anti-nuclear movement was directed toward French 
 20
testing, which lasted well into the 1990s.  One of the major episodes that pushed the 
region further toward the nuclear free zone agreement was the French bombing of the 
Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour, which happened about a year 
after the Treaty of Rarotonga was drafted and a few weeks before it was to be signed.  
Power (1986: 467) lists some of the consequences that stemmed from this event.  It 
strengthened South Pacific commitment to anti-testing policies, “improved perceptions of 
the Lange government,” and strengthened New Zealand’s position on a ban of “nuclear-
related vessels” from its ports.  France was still committed to their nuclear testing, 
however, and kept their position against the idea of a nuclear free Pacific until President 
Jacques Chirac ended the testing program and authorized Gaston Flosse, Secretary of 
State for South Pacific Affairs, to sign the treaty in March 1996, along with 
representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom (Regnault 2005: 351).  Four 
of the five major nuclear powers that signed the Treaty of Rarotonga have ratified it, the 
United States is the only state out of those five that has not done so. 
 
The literature on the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone explains in great detail the 
motivations of the states which are parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga.  It largely came 
about because of the exploitation of the major nuclear powers which had colonized the 
region.  The largest nuclear testing programs were carried out by France and the United 
States, but France has accepted the anti-nuclear feelings of the states in the region and the 
United States has not.  So now that we have seen one example of the US position on this 
type of nonproliferation strategy, the question emerges as to why that position appears to 
be inconsistent, especially when comparing the South Pacific with Latin America. 
 21
Arms control measures such as NWFZs are a type of prevention, and although it has been 
the policy of the US to discourage the pursuit of nuclear weapons (Brown 2007), there 
are some issues that could prevent the US from fully supporting NWFZs.  One is the 
issue of negative security assurances, a promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against parties to the treaty, which the US has begun backing away from 
because of the possibility of their interests being threatened by non-NWS and non-state 
actors (Blair and du Preez 2005).  Another is that these NWFZ agreements are 
multilateral, and “in general, the United States prefers to negotiate commitments with 
individual nations rather than with multiple countries or with multilateral institutions” 
(Caruson and Farrar-Myers 2007: 639).  So again, this leads to the question of 
inconsistencies in the US responses to the NWFZs, both on the domestic level and the 
international level.
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THEORY 
 
To address my research question about which factors affect the inconsistent US response 
to NWFZ agreements, my theory is based on Putnam’s (1988) two-level game and a list 
of seven criteria which a NWFZ agreement must meet to be accepted by the US.  
According to Blaz (1987), these seven criteria determine whether the NWFZ agreement 
in question supports the strategic interests of the US.  So my theory and the seven criteria 
are based on US strategic interests and how the NWFZ agreements interact with those 
interests.  According to Blaz (1987: np), the seven criteria are:  
1. The initiative is from the nations in the region; 
2. All nations whose participation is deemed important participate; 
3. Adequate verification of compliance is provided; 
4. It does not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of 
regional and international security; 
5. All parties are barred from developing or possessing any nuclear device 
for any purpose; 
6. It imposes no restriction on international legal maritime and aerial 
navigation rights and freedoms; and 
7. It does not affect the international legal rights of parties to grant or deny 
other transit privileges, including port calls and overflights. 
 
At first, these criteria may seem to be the answer to my question – perhaps the US only 
supports the NWFZ agreements which meet all of these seven criteria and rejects those 
that do not.  But it does not appear to be so simple.  These criteria may not be all that the   
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US relies on when choosing how to respond to a NWFZ treaty.  For example, Blaz (1987) 
argues that the Treaty of Rarotonga meets all seven of these criteria, yet the US did not 
sign until 1996 and continues to avoid ratification of the Treaty.  Therefore, with the help 
of Putnam (1988) I develop my own theory and list of factors to explain why the US has 
responded inconsistently to the NWFZ agreements.  As part of this theory, I derive a list 
of seven hypotheses to attempt to answer my research question.  Within the structure of 
Putnam’s (1988) two-level game, the first four hypotheses fall under Level I 
(international) and the remaining three hypotheses fall under Level II (domestic).  My 
theory is that although all of the conditions highlighted in my hypotheses are important in 
determining US support for NWFZ treaties, there are three conditions that best explain 
why the US has fully supported one of the treaties and has only partially supported two 
others.  What is interesting and different about these three explanatory conditions is that 
they are missing from the seven criteria listed above, which supports my argument that 
the seven criteria are not the only criteria that the US considers when negotiating their 
support for these treaties. 
 
The first of my Level I hypotheses suggests that one factor that may influence US 
policies is system structure, specifically the remnants of the bipolar system of the Cold 
War and how balancing between the US and Russia continues to exist.  I would suspect 
the US and the Soviet Union to pay very close attention and make decisions on these 
NWFZ agreements depending on the actions of the other, balancing their behavior.  As 
suggested in the previous chapter, the US and the Soviet Union were leaders in the 
creation of the NPT regime, so nuclear arms control is an important issue to both sides.  
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Because the US and Russia are still two of the major NWS, I suspect that that balancing 
behavior exhibited during the Cold War era will continue to exist and I expect that 
however the Soviet Union (for the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga) or Russia (for 
the Pelindaba Treaty) responds, it will affect the way the US responds.  My first 
hypothesis is developed from this balancing behavior between the US and the Soviet 
Union/Russia:  
Hypothesis 1: The international system structure and balancing behavior 
during the Cold War has an effect on how the US responds to NWFZ 
agreements that exists both during and after the Cold War era. 
 
Another important factor that lends to the context of the international environment is the 
NPT regime, an attempt at cooperation on a more global scale than the NWFZ 
agreements, supported by both the US and the Soviet Union/Russia.  Does the importance 
of a global attempt at nuclear arms control and cooperation affect the US response to 
regional attempts at denuclearization?  The earliest NWFZ treaty was created before the 
NPT was open for signature, so perhaps the others interact differently with the NPT.  
Perhaps over time as the NPT regime has appeared to be weakening, as discussed in the 
literature review (Hanson 2005, Leaver 2005, Wesley 2005, Pilat 2007), the US struggles 
to conclude whether or not such arms control mechanisms will be worth supporting, even 
though they are generally not supportive of proliferation (Brown 2007).  The second part 
of this category leads to my second hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2: If a NWFZ agreement is created when the NPT is being 
negotiated (or renewed), then the US is more likely to support it. 
 
The next Level I hypothesis is focused on the states involved in drafting the NWFZ 
agreements.  Which actors are advocating for the creation of the agreement?  Was the US 
 25
involved in the development of any of these agreements?  It would make sense to 
conclude that if the US was involved in the creation of the treaties, they would be more 
likely to support the treaties as they reached the signature stage.  For example, the Treaty 
of Tlatelolco (1967) followed closely behind the Cuban Missile Crisis, so 
denuclearization in Latin America became an important issue in the Western Hemisphere.  
Therefore, this could partially explain why the US signed and ratified this first NWFZ 
treaty.  So, my third hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 3: If the US is involved in the creation of the treaty, then they 
are more likely to support it. 
 
The final condition within Level I is proliferation.  Are there states within the proposed 
zones that have expressed interest in or have the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons?  If 
there are dangers of proliferation within the region, the US might be more likely to take 
action to halt such movements in an attempt to protect their own security interests which 
includes making sure they have a security advantage over others based on the neorealist 
assumption that states are security seekers and the interests of the NPT regime.  This 
leads to my next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The US is more likely to support a NWFZ if there are 
proliferation threats in the region. 
 
 
My last three hypotheses can be considered domestic conditions under Level II of 
Putnam’s (1988) two-level game because even though some of them affect what happens 
internationally, they are conditions which would have to be approved by domestic actors 
in the ratification stage.  The first of these conditions involves the types of restrictions 
that the US is willing to accept within one of these NWFZ agreements.  Examples of 
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some controversial issues would include transit restrictions and negative security 
assurances.  One major issue that surrounds the creation of the SPNFZ is the issue of port 
visits and flyovers, especially after a New Zealand law banned all nuclear armed and 
nuclear capable vessels from its ports, which angered the US enough to exclude New 
Zealand from the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS).  
Negative security assurances, which are built into each of the NWFZ treaties, are an 
attempt to ensure that the NWS will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against 
the treaty’s contracting parties.  So the idea is that the NWS promise not to use their 
nuclear deterrent against the denuclearized zone as long as the contracting parties adhere 
to the provisions of the treaty.  These negative security assurances were identified by the 
UN as an obligation of the NWS by the UN General Assembly (1975: Resolution 3472 
(XXX)).  The idea of negative security assurances was supported early on by the US, but 
more recently that has not been the case because of the possibility of security threats from 
non-state and non-nuclear actors (Blair and du Preez 2005).  My next hypothesis was 
developed from these examples: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The more the US is restricted by the provisions of an 
agreement, the less likely they are to support it. 
 
 
The next Level II hypothesis focuses on US strategic interests, specifically the existence 
of formal security relationships in the regions covered by the NWFZ agreements.  If there 
are existing security relationships with states within the zone, how would the creation of 
the NWFZ interact with these relationships?  Security relationships are strategically 
important and could therefore constrict the options the US has in accepting these 
agreements.  The NWFZ treaties could clash with existing defense arrangements as it did 
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in the example of the ANZUS crisis which was sparked by the port-visit standoff between 
the US and New Zealand in February 1985.  The Labour Party government led by David 
Lange officially banned nuclear armed and nuclear powered ships and aircraft after their 
election victory in 1984 (Clements 1988).  When the Lange government refused to allow 
a visit from the USS Buchanan, the Reagan Administration protested by cutting New 
Zealand off from its previous security relationship which ultimately led to the decision 
for the US to “unilaterally [withdraw] its security obligations to New Zealand under the 
1951 ANZUS agreement” (Clements 1988: 395).  This leads to my next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 6: If the region is strategically important, for example, if the 
US would not be able to fulfill its duties under existing bilateral or 
multilateral security agreements because of their nuclear policies, then 
they are less likely to support the NWFZ treaty. 
 
 
My final hypothesis is a simple one, also falling under the Level II category.  The 
Democratic Party’s platform (2008) compared with the Republican Party’s platform 
(2008) suggests that Democratic politicians show a greater concern for nuclear arms 
control and strengthening international treaties such as the NPT.  So the response of the 
US to these NWFZ agreements could be explained by which party is in power at the time 
these agreements are created.  Therefore, my final hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Democrats are more likely than Republicans to support 
these agreements. 
 
 
Out of these seven hypotheses, I expect to find that the most influential conditions will be 
those addressed in hypotheses two, three, and seven.  This theory combines both Level I 
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and Level II factors that are not directly addressed in the seven criteria outlined by 
Representative Blaz (1987). 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
To test these proposed hypotheses, the qualitative case study method of a structured, 
focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005) will be used because of the small number 
of potential cases.  The unit of analysis will be the NWFZ treaties.  Technically, there are 
nine international treaties which create NWFZs: the Antarctic Treaty (1959), the Treaty 
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space (1967), the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), the Treaty on the Prohibition of the 
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-
Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (1971), the Agreement Governing 
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979), the Treaty of 
Rarotonga (1985), the Bangkok Treaty (1995), the Pelindaba Treaty (1996), and the 
Semipalatinsk Treaty (2006) (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 2008).  To 
select my cases from this list, I followed two particular criteria.  First of all, the zone 
should cover sovereign states.  This throws out Antarctica, the Seabed, outer space, and 
the moon and other celestial bodies.  Each of the remaining five agreements has one or 
more additional protocols for the inclusion of the NWS.  Of these, I chose the cases 
which the US has initially pledged its support by signing the protocols open to it.  This 
cuts the Bangkok Treaty that established the Southeast Asian NWFZ and the 
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Semipalatinsk Treaty that established the Central Asian NWFZ.  These two cases would, 
of course, be useful additions to my study because the US has responded differently to 
these, but it seems that there may not be enough available data to evaluate these cases at 
this point because the data for the US responses to these cases are not available from the 
UNODA (2009) database.  The three cases left are the Treaty of Tlatelolco that 
established the NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Treaty of Rarotonga that 
established the South Pacific NWFZ, and the Pelindaba Treaty which will establish an 
African NWFZ. 
 
I have created a list of focus questions to carry out the evaluation of these three cases.  
Each question is derived from the proposed hypotheses.  Many of these questions are also 
closely related to the seven criteria mentioned in the theory section.  Those that are not, 
are linked to the hypotheses which I believe will help further explain why the US has not 
fully supported all of the agreements.  The questions are: 
 
1. What types of restrictions does the agreement place on NWS and what 
was the US response? 
 
2. How is the region strategically important to the US?  For example, does 
the US have formal security commitments to states or territories within the 
region?  Would those commitments be significantly hindered by a NWFZ 
agreement? 
 
3. How did other NWS respond to the agreement?  Did that affect the US 
response? 
 
4. To what extent are there proliferation concerns within the region? 
 
5. How does the treaty interact with the timing of the NPT? 
 
6. Did the US have any influence in the creation of the treaty? 
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7. Which party controlled the presidency and the Senate at the time of 
drafting, signing, and if applicable, ratification of the treaty? 
 
 
Within the three case studies, data and evidence used to evaluate these questions are 
based primarily on content analysis of the three treaties and the responses of the NWS 
available from the UNODA Treaties Database (UNODA 2009).  Supporting documents 
were also reviewed to help clarify issues that may not have been fully addressed within 
the texts of the treaties.  These supporting documents include US Congressional debates, 
the Palau Compact of Free Association, Resolutions of the UN General Assembly, and 
the existing literature on the individual treaties.  The cases will be presented through a 
narrative of the development of each treaty and each will conclude with the answers to 
the above focus questions drawn from that narrative.  A summary will also be provided 
on how well each hypothesis fits the case. 
 
Content analysis is defined as “a careful, detailed, systematic examination and 
interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, 
biases, and meanings” (Berg 2008: 338).  I used a system of open coding, one aspect of 
which is to “ask the data a specific and consistent set of questions” (Berg 2008: 354) by 
looking at the treaty articles and supplemental data to determine answers to the set of 
questions listed above.  To determine the degree to which each hypothesis was supported 
by the answers to these questions, I simply labeled each hypotheses “high,” “medium,” or 
“low” for each case, and in some instances felt that the evidence was somewhere between 
“high” and “medium” so there are a few hypotheses that are labeled as “medium-high”.  
For each hypothesis, I developed a certain set of rules that would define these labels.  
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Table 1 provides the definitions of these rules. 
 
Table 1. Hypothesis Support Label Definitions 
Hypothesis “High” “Medium” “Low” 
1. The international 
system structure and 
balancing behavior 
during the Cold War has 
an effect on how the US 
responds to NWFZ 
agreements that exists 
both during and after 
the Cold War era. 
If the Soviet response 
clearly had some impact 
on the US response. 
If the US considered the 
Soviet response but 
another state’s response 
was more important. 
If the Soviet response 
had no effect. 
2. If a NWFZ agreement 
is created when the NPT 
is being negotiated (or 
renewed), then the US is 
more likely to support it. 
If the US signed and 
ratified when the NPT 
was an important global 
issue. 
If the US signed when 
the NPT was an 
important global issue, 
but did not ratify. 
If the NPT context had 
no effect. 
3. If the US is involved 
in the creation of the 
treaty, then they are 
more likely to support it. 
If the US was directly 
involved in creating the 
treaty, and both signs 
and ratifies the treaty. 
If the US is somehow 
indirectly involved and 
only provides limited 
support. 
If the US was not an 
influential force and 
offered limited or no 
support. 
4. The US is more likely 
to support a NWFZ if 
there are proliferation 
threats in the region. 
If a proliferation threat 
exists and the US signs 
and ratifies the treaty. 
If a proliferation threat 
exists and the US signs, 
or if no threat exists and 
the US signs. 
If no proliferation threat 
exists and no US 
support. 
5. The more the US is 
restricted by the 
provisions of an 
agreement, the less 
likely they are to support 
it. 
If there are major 
restriction issues such as 
NSAs and transport 
restrictions; no US 
support. 
If the US conditionally 
accepts such restrictions 
and offers at least some 
support. 
If restrictions have no 
effect. 
6. If the region is 
strategically important, 
for example, if the US 
would not be able to 
fulfill its duties under 
existing bilateral or 
multilateral security 
agreements because of 
their nuclear policies, 
then they are less likely 
to support the NWFZ 
treaty. 
If there is a concern 
over existing 
agreements and the US 
offers no support. 
If existing agreements 
are addressed and the 
US offers limited 
support. 
If existing agreements 
have no effect. 
7. Democrats are more 
likely than Republicans 
to support these 
agreements. 
If a Democratic 
president signs and a 
Democratic Senate 
ratifies. 
Mix between “low” and 
“high” 
Republican president 
signs; Republican 
Senate ratifies; 
Democratic Senate does 
not ratify. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
TLATELOLCO 
 
Although earlier international treaties had created NWFZs in Antarctica and Outer Space, 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first of its kind, creating a regional NWFZ among 
sovereign states.  The Treaty reveals that it was influenced by a number of resolutions 
passed by the UN General Assembly.  In the earliest of these, one conclusion reached by 
Resolution 808 (IX) was that an international disarmament convention should be created 
to provide for “the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons…” 
(UN General Assembly 1954: 3).  Resolution 1911 (XVIII) recognized the efforts of five 
Latin American states which issued “a declaration on the denuclearization of Latin 
America” on 29 April 1963 (UN General Assembly 1963: 15).  The Treaty of Tlatelolco 
was also influenced by Resolution 2028 (XX) on the Non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons (UN General Assembly: 1965), and like the NPT itself which was created after 
this agreement, the Treaty of Tlatelolco highlights the goal of eventually achieving 
complete disarmament.  So hypothesis two is supported since the US supported this 
agreement which was created while the NPT was an important global issue.  Fifteen Latin 
American and Caribbean states signed the Treaty on 14 February 1967 and eventually 33 
signed and deposited instruments of ratification.  Table 1 illustrates which states are 
signatories to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.  One unique characteristic of this NWFZ 
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agreement is that it entered into force for each individual state as it ratified the Treaty.  
This Treaty is also unique because among the three treaties examined here, it is the only 
one in which the Additional Protocols have been signed and ratified by the US. 
 
Table 2. Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (UNODA 2009) 
State Signature Deposit 
Mexico 14 February 1967 20 September 1967 
Nicaragua 15 February 1967 24 October 1967 
Brazil 9 May 1967 29 January 1968 
El Salvador 14 February 1967 22 April 1968 
Dominican Republic 28 July 1967 14 June 1968 
Uruguay 14 February 1967 20 August 1968 
Honduras 14 February 1967 23 September 1968 
Ecuador 14 February 1967 11 February 1969 
Bolivia 14 February 1967 18 February 1969 
Peru 14 February 1967 4 March 1969 
Paraguay 26 April 1967 19 March 1969 
Barbados 18 October 1968 25 April 1969 
Haiti 14 February 1967 23 May 1969 
Jamaica 26 October 1967 26 June 1969 
Costa Rica 14 February 1967 25 August 1969 
Guatemala 14 February 1967 6 February 1970 
Venezuela 14 February 1967 23 March 1970 
Trinidad and Tobago 27 June 1967 3 December 1970 
Panama 14 February 1967 11 June 1971 
Colombia 14 February 1967 4 August 1972 
Chile 14 February 1967 9 October 1974 
Grenada 29 April 1975 20 June 1975 
Bahamas 29 November 1976 26 April 1977 
Suriname 13 February 1976 10 June 1977 
Antigua and Barbuda 11 October 1983 11 October 1983 
St Vincent and the Grenadines 14 February 1992 14 February 1992 
Dominica 2 May 1989 4 June 1993 
Argentina 27 September 1967 18 January 1994 
Belize 14 February 1992 9 November 1994 
Guyana 16 January 1995 16 January 1995 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 18 February 1994 18 April 1995 
Saint Lucia 25 August 1992 2 June 1995 
Cuba 25 March 1995 23 October 2002 
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The Additional Protocols 
 
 
The Treaty of Tlatelolco includes two Additional Protocols which appeal to the NWS and 
other states with territorial claims in the region.  Additional Protocol I applies the 
prohibition of nuclear weapons to territories within the zone in which outside states are 
de jure or de facto internationally responsible.  This Protocol is open for signature to 
France, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US.  Additional Protocol II calls for respect of 
the denuclearization of Latin America, for the signatories not to contribute to the 
violation of the Treaty by other parties to the Treaty, and provides negative security 
assurances.  Table 3 illustrates which states have signed and ratified the Additional 
Protocols. 
 
Table 3. The Additional Protocols (UNODA 2009) 
 Protocol I Protocol II 
NWS Signature Deposit Signature Deposit 
China n/a n/a 21 Aug 1973 12 Jun 1974 
France 2 Mar 1979 24 Aug 1992 18 Jul 1973 22 Mar 1974 
Netherlands 15 Mar 1968 26 Jul 1971 n/a n/a 
Russia n/a n/a 18 May 1978 8 Jan 1979 
UK 20 Dec 1967 11 Dec 1969 20 Dec 1967 11 Dec 1969 
US 26 May 1977 23 Nov 1981 1 Apr 1968 12 May 1971 
 
 
The US first signed and ratified Additional Protocol II with the understanding that  
as regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten 
to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the United States 
would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in 
which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapons State, would be incompatible 
with the Contracting Party’s corresponding obligations under Article 1 of 
the Treaty. (UNODA 2009: np) 
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So this provides some support for hypothesis five because one of the major restriction 
issues, negative security assurances, is conditionally accepted by the US. 
 
The Protocol was transmitted to the Senate on 13 August 1970 and approved by a 70-0 
vote on 19 April 1971.  The US ratified Protocol I on the condition that its 
understandings and declarations to its ratification of Protocol II apply to Protocol I as 
well and highlighted the issues of transit and transport privileges, as well as freedom of 
the seas.  Protocol I was transmitted to the Senate on 24 May 1978 and approved by a 79-
0 vote on 13 November 1981.  Therefore, US territories in the region, such as Puerto 
Rico and the US Virgin Islands, became part of the NWFZ.  As this Treaty was created 
during the Cold War, in April 1982, the Soviet Union countered the US by expressing its 
own view of the reservations made by the US regarding transit issues: 
The Soviet side considers it necessary to emphasize that the transport of 
nuclear weapons is covered by the prohibitions provided for in article 1 of 
the Treaty and that permission of the transit of nuclear weapons in any 
form through the zone of application of the Treaty would be contrary to 
the purposes of the Treaty, according to which, as specifically stated in its 
preamble, Latin America must be wholly free from nuclear weapons, and 
would be inconsistent with the nuclear-free status of the States Parties to 
the Treaty and their obligations defined in article 1 thereof. 
It is requested that the Government of Mexico, as depositary of the Treaty 
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, should bring the 
above position of the Soviet Union to the attention of the States Parties to 
the Treaty and to its Additional Protocols I and II. (UNODA 2009: np) 
 
This addresses hypothesis five because it allows for transport, the second major 
restriction issue I mentioned in the Theory chapter, so I would continue to label this 
hypothesis as receiving medium support because of the response to the restrictions in this 
Treaty.  Also, the response of the Soviet Union addresses hypothesis one.  I would give 
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hypothesis one high support because of their debates over transport issues and because it 
took much longer for the Soviet Union to sign and ratify the Treaty. 
 
 
Proliferation in Latin America? 
 
 
There have been a few minor proliferation concerns in the region.  Cuba, of course, at 
one point was willing to host Soviet medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
pointed at the US and Venezuela’s Chavez has expressed interest in a nuclear deterrent 
(Trinkunas 2006).  The states in the region with the greatest chance at successfully 
developing nuclear capabilities are Argentina and Brazil, pursued that possibility under 
strong military regimes, but abandoned the pursuit of nuclear military programs with 
democratization.  Civilian control of their nuclear programs under democratic 
governments sought to “undermine the power of their own militaries, which they viewed 
as a greater threat to democracy than any potential external adversary, even in the wake 
of Argentina’s defeat in the Malvinas (Falklands) war” (Trinkunas 2006: 617).  The 
countries’ interests in nuclear programs are the reason both took quite a while to accede 
to the Treaty.  This addresses hypothesis four, which I would label as highly supported 
because of the issues surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Hypothesis six is indirectly 
addressed through the issue of strategic importance, but I would label this as low support 
for hypothesis six because the US strategic relationship with Latin America differs from 
the other two regions in this study. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This case provided the following answers to the focus questions: 
 
1. What types of restrictions does the agreement place on NWS and what was 
the US response? 
Additional Protocols include any territories within the region, prohibit the 
NWS from violating the treaty provisions within the zone, and provide 
negative security assurances. In this case, the US signed and ratified with 
reservations regarding these types of issues. 
 
2. How is the region strategically important to the US? 
The region was strategically important because the US wanted to keep 
other major powers out of the Western Hemisphere.  The NWFZ 
complemented this strategy.  The US also has territorial claims in the 
region. The US territories in the Caribbean are covered by Protocol I, 
which the US took longer to sign and ratify than Protocol II. 
 
3. How did other NWS respond to the agreement? Did that affect the US 
response? 
The major problem was that the US and the Soviet Union disagreed over 
the transport issue.  The Treaty was created on the heels of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis and the US signed Protocol II in 1968, not long after the 
creation of the Treaty.  It took longer for the US to sign Protocol I to 
include their Caribbean territories within the zone.  They signed and 
ratified Protocol I around the same time that the Soviet Union finally 
signed and ratified Protocol II. 
 
4. To what extent are there proliferation concerns within the region? 
At one time, there was a possibility of Argentina and Brazil pursuing 
proliferation, but the main concern at the time was the Soviet presence in 
Cuba and the effects of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
 
5. How does the treaty interact with the timing of the NPT? 
The Treaty of Tlatelolco was created when the NPT was being developed.  
The NPT was definitely an important international issue at the time. 
 
6. Did the US have any influence in the creation of the treaty? 
The creation of the Treaty was in some ways influenced and advocated by 
the UN and a regional declaration was created in April 1963.  Because of 
the nature of the US strategic interest in the region, it is likely that the US 
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did have an influence on the creation of the Treaty since it was created so 
soon after the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
 
7. Which party controlled the presidency and the senate at the time of 
drafting, signing, and if applicable, ratification of the treaty? 
When the Treaty of Tlatelolco was drafted in February 1967, the president 
(Johnson) and the senate were Democratic.  Johnson also signed 
Additional Protocol I in April 1968 and Carter (also a Democrat) signed 
Additional Protocol II in May 1977.  A Democratic Senate ratified 
Protocol II in May 1971 but a Republican Senate ratified Protocol I in 
November 1981. 
 
 
Hypotheses one, two, three, four, and seven are probably the most important in this case.  
The US ended up fully supporting this NWFZ agreement within the context of a bipolar 
system, although it did take them a while to ratify both Additional Protocols.  Hypothesis 
two is supported because the Treaty of Tlatelolco is the only one of the three Treaties 
examined here that was created before the NPT, and also the closest to the development 
of the NPT.  So, it was quite a paramount issue on the international level at the time.  
Hypothesis three is important because this treaty is the only one that has been fully 
supported by the US, but also the one that received the most direct influence.  Hypothesis 
four is be supported by the issues surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis.  The US is not 
restricted too much and it addresses transit and transport issues in its declarations in 
signing and ratifying the Protocols, so hypothesis five is supported.  Hypothesis six is not 
really supported, but the US territorial claims in the Caribbean could be an important 
factor in why it took longer to ratify Protocol I than Protocol II.  Also, this region is 
considered strategically important, but in a different way than the other regions discussed 
here.  The US may have been more likely to support this agreement because their strategy 
in the Western Hemisphere was to keep other major powers out.  Table 4 offers a 
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summary of the hypotheses and evidence from this case and to what degree the 
hypotheses were supported.  In addition to the hypotheses derived from the seven criteria, 
the additional three hypotheses I projected would also be important (two, three, and 
seven), have at least medium-high support in this case. 
 
Table 4. Hypothesis Summary Table: Tlatelolco 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Evidence 
Level of 
Support 
1. The international system structure and 
balancing behavior during the Cold War 
has an effect on how the US responds to 
NWFZ agreements that exists both during 
and after the Cold War era. 
Cuban Missile Crisis 
US and Soviet Union disagree over 
transport issue 
High 
2. If a NWFZ agreement is created when the 
NPT is being negotiated (or renewed), then 
the US is more likely to support it. 
NPT being developed when the Treaty 
was created 
Medium-
High 
3. If the US is involved in the creation of the 
treaty, then they are more likely to support 
it. 
Likely because of the Treaty was created 
so soon after the Cuban Missile Crisis High 
4. The US is more likely to support a NWFZ 
if there are proliferation threats in the 
region. 
Cuban Missile Crisis 
Argentina and Brazil High 
5. The more the US is restricted by the 
provisions of an agreement, the less likely 
they are to support it. 
Transport issue and negative security 
assurances conditionally accepted Medium 
6. If the region is strategically important, 
for example, if the US would not be able to 
fulfill its duties under existing bilateral or 
multilateral security agreements because of 
their nuclear policies, then they are less 
likely to support the NWFZ treaty. 
Different strategic relationship in Latin 
America Low 
7. Democrats are more likely than 
Republicans to support these agreements. 
Signatures and ratifications all 
Democratic except for the ratification of 
Protocol I by a Republican senate 
Medium-
High 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
RAROTONGA 
 
Regnault (2005: 343) asserts that for Pacific states, “the atomic weapon is not considered 
a deterrent but an instrument of total destruction.”  As mentioned in the literature review, 
one of the biggest motivating factors behind the general Pacific attitude toward the 
nuclear issue was that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France used areas of 
their colonial territories for nuclear weapons testing sites (Power 1986, Sawyer 1986, 
Regnault 2005).  By the time the Treaty of Rarotonga was created, most of the anti-
nuclear movement was specifically aimed at France because their testing programs in 
French Polynesia continued into the mid-1990s.  It was the Pacific Islanders themselves 
who most strongly advocated for a NWFZ, generally through anti-nuclear movements 
such as Against Testing on Moruroa (ATOM), which began in Fiji in 1970 (Regnault 
2005).  The US did not have any direct influence on the development of the treaty, but 
indirectly through close ally Australia.  Ben Blaz (1987: np), the former US Delegate 
from Guam wrote in response to US refusal to sign the Treaty, commenting that “the 
Australians went the extra distance for us on this treaty, ensuring that it did not 
compromise our essential defense needs and strategic interests in the region. Specifically, 
they were largely responsible for ensuring the treaty did not ban the transit and port calls 
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of our nuclear navy ships and overflights of nuclear weapons-capable aircraft. How have 
we thanked them for their effort? By leaving them dangling slowly in the wind, naked to 
the criticism of their regional neighbors that Australia carries little weight in our 
councils.”  So, since the US had some indirect influence on the decision making process 
of creating provisions within the treaty but has offered only limited support, hypothesis 
three has medium support in this case. 
 
Eight states signed the Treaty when it was opened for signatures at Rarotonga in the 
Cook Islands on 6 August 1985 and entered into force when the eighth instrument of 
ratification was deposited in December 1986.  Thirteen eligible states have now signed 
and ratified the treaty, creating a “zone that stretches from Australia to Kiribati, from the 
equator to the Antarctic – an immense trapezoid covering some 12 million square miles 
of the Earth’s surface” (Blaz 1987: np).  Table 5 illustrates which Pacific states are party 
to the Treaty of Rarotonga. 
 
Table 5. Parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga (UNODA 2009) 
State Signature Deposit 
Fiji 6 August 1985 4 October 1985 
Cook Islands 6 August 1985 28 October 1985 
Tuvalu 6 August 1985 16 January 1986 
Niue 6 August 1985 12 May 1986 
Samoa 6 August 1985 20 October 1986 
Kiribati 6 August 1985 28 October 1986 
New Zealand 6 August 1985 13 November 1986 
Australia 6 August 1985 11 December 1986 
Nauru 17 July 1986 13 April 1987 
Solomon Islands 29 May 1987 27 January 1989 
Papua New Guinea 16 September 1985 15 September 1989 
Vanuatu 16 September 1995 9 February 1996 
Tonga 2 August 1996 18 December 2000 
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Unlike the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Pelindaba Treaty, the Treaty of Rarotonga does 
not emphasize civilian nuclear use.  It also prohibits all nuclear explosive devices, 
including those which may be considered as being used for peaceful purposes (Articles 3 
and 4).  It attempted to go further than its predecessor and is therefore referred to not as a 
NWFZ, but a nuclear free zone (NFZ). 
 
 
Rarotonga and the NPT 
 
 
The Treaty of Rarotonga was written 15 years after the NPT entered into force and 
recognizes its importance in the Treaty Preamble.  The Treaty specifically mentions 
Article VII of the NPT which states “the right of any group of States to conclude regional 
treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective 
territories” (UNODA 2009: np).  When the US finally did decide to sign the Treaty, the 
announcement came soon after the extension of the NPT in 1995.  President Clinton 
wrote a note to strong supporter of the Treaty, Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, the US Delegate 
of American Samoa, to express the importance of the SPNFZ to the nonproliferation 
regime: 
… Last year's NPT Review and Extension Conference agreed that 
internationally recognized nuclear free zones, based on arrangements fully 
arrived at among the states of the region concerned, enhance international 
peace and security. The Conference also agreed that the cooperation of all 
the nuclear weapon states and their respect and support for the relevant 
protocols are necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such zones. 
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Our decision to sign the SPNFZ protocols demonstrates our clear support 
for a nuclear weapons-free zone in the South Pacific, our commitment to 
nuclear nonproliferation and our determination to achieve a 
Comprehensive Test Ban treaty mandating a permanent end to nuclear 
testing throughout the world. (US Congress 1996) 
 
This shows that in the mid-1990s there was a shift in support for the Treaty.  But was this 
shift a result of the support to extend the NPT or was it France’s decision to stop testing?  
The impact of France’s decision will be explained below, but this lends a medium level 
of support to hypothesis two because the US, along with the UK and France, did not sign 
the Treaty until the NPT once again became an important global issue. 
 
 
Restrictions on the NWS 
 
 
One of the biggest issues, especially after the port visit standoff between the US and New 
Zealand, was the question of transit.  The US did not want to be restricted from port visits 
and overflights in the zone.  But, as I mentioned above, Australia worked to reach a 
halfway point to accommodate the security interests of the US.  Therefore, the Treaty 
itself does not take the same position as New Zealand in that it does not prohibit port 
visits and overflights from nuclear armed and nuclear capable vessels.  It allows the states 
to make these decisions: 
Each Party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to decide for 
itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and 
airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by 
foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not 
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covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane passage or 
transit passage of straits. (Article 5, Paragraph 2) 
 
So since there is the possibility of some states not allowing such transit options, this type 
of restriction provides some support for hypothesis five. 
 
The official restrictions on the NWS are found in the three Additional Protocols.  
Protocol I prohibits the manufacturing, testing, and stationing of nuclear explosive 
devices in the NWS territories located within the zone.  Only three of the five NWS have 
territorial claims within the zone, so this Protocol is open for signature by France, the 
United Kingdom, and the US.  Additional Protocol II includes the negative security 
assurance, to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against parties to the 
Treaty and the territories covered by Additional Protocol I.  This Protocol also prohibits 
assisting any party to the Treaty in violating the Articles of the Treaty.  The US included 
similar reservations and conditions when signing this Protocol as they included when 
they signed and ratified Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.  This also addresses 
hypothesis five, and with the combination of transit and negative security assurance 
issues, hypothesis five has medium-high support.  Protocol II is open for signature by all 
five NWS.  Additional Protocol III further emphasizes the Pacific’s position on nuclear 
testing by prohibiting nuclear testing anywhere within the zone.  The third Protocol is 
also open for signature by all five NWS.  Table 6 illustrates which of the NWS have 
signed and deposited instruments of ratification for the Additional Protocols open to 
them. 
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Table 6. NWS and the Additional Protocols (UNODA 2009) 
 Protocol I Protocol II 
NWS Signature Deposit Signature Deposit 
Russia n/a n/a 15 Dec 1986 21 Apr 1988 
China n/a n/a 10 Feb 1987 21 Oct 1988 
France 25 Mar 1996 20 Sep 1996 25 Mar 1996 20 Sep 1996 
UK 25 Mar 1996 19 Sep 1997 25 Mar 1996 19 Sep 1997 
US 25 Mar 1996  25 Mar 1996  
 Protocol III 
NWS Signature Deposit 
Russia 15 Dec 1986 21 Apr 1988 
China 10 Feb 1987 21 Oct 1988 
France 25 Mar 1996 20 Sep 1996 
UK 25 Mar 1996 19 Sep 1997 
US 25 Mar 1996  
 
 
Rarotonga and the International Environment 
 
 
As I mentioned in the Theory chapter, during this part of the Cold War, the US continued 
to struggle to balance against the Soviet Union and China by staying on the side of 
France and the UK, even though the US Congress showed some support for the Treaty.  
The Soviet Union and China showed support early on by quickly signing and ratifying 
the Treaty, although the Soviet Union did so with several significant reservations.  With 
China’s signature, they offered their respect of the hard work that the South Pacific put 
toward creating a NFZ and reasserted their strict no-first-use policy, and urged the NWS 
with significant power in the region to recognize their special responsibilities (UNODA 
2009).  The Soviet Union asserted that they disagreed with the transit issue, that any 
nuclear explosive device being transported through the zone is a violation of the Treaty, 
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reaffirmed their stand on calling for independence of the colonized areas in the region, 
and that 
…In the event of any actions undertaken by the state or states, which are 
parties to the Rarotonga Treaty, in violation of their main commitments 
under the Treaty connected with the non-nuclear status of the zone and 
perpetration by one or several states parties to the Treaty of an act of 
aggression with the support of a state having nuclear weapons or jointly 
with it with the use by such a state of the territory, air space, territorial sea 
or archipelago waters of those countries for calls by naval ships and flying 
vehicles with nuclear weapons on board or transit of nuclear weapons, the 
Soviet Union will have the right to consider itself free from the 
commitments undertaken under Protocol Two to the Treaty.  In the event 
of any other actions by the parties to the Treaty incompatible with their 
non-nuclear status, the USSR reserves for itself the right to reconsider the 
commitments undertaken under the said Protocol. (UNODA 2009) 
 
The fact that the Soviet Union signed and ratified the Treaty posed some negative 
consequences for the US.  Blaz (1987: np) comments that “America's image has been 
significantly damaged by our refusal to sign.  We have handed the Soviets a propaganda 
bonus.” 
 
This propaganda bonus was difficult to deal with, as the US still held France as a close 
ally and an important part of the Western deterrent.  The French absolutely refused to 
sign the Treaty because of their continuing nuclear weapons testing program at Mururoa 
in French Polynesia, and one of the issues that Blaz (1987: np) also points out is that 
“signing the treaty would add the considerable weight of official U.S. support for the 
movement to force the French government to cease its nuclear testing program at 
Mururoa.”  Since this divide between the US and the Soviet Union, in addition to the role 
of France, was still a major issue, hypothesis one has medium level support. 
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The US also feared that by supporting NWFZs, other zones may begin to develop in areas 
of even higher strategic importance, such as Southeast Asia (especially the Philippines) 
and Central Europe (Blaz 1987).  But the US had already supported several NWFZ 
agreements mentioned above, such as the zones of Antarctica, the Seabed, Space, and 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
 
Security Relationships in the Pacific 
 
 
There are two US dependencies located within the SPNFZ – Jarvis Island and American 
Samoa.  H. Con. Res. 158 (US Congress, 1987: np) urges the administration to consider 
signing the Treaty of Rarotonga, and mentions that “the administration has testified to the 
Congress that the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga do not prohibit any current or 
anticipated activities in American territories in the South Pacific (American Samoa and 
Jarvis Island) or elsewhere in the region.”  The US also has special defense relationships 
with most of the Micronesian island states.  Three Micronesian members of the Pacific 
Islands Forum (PIF) are notably absent from the Treaty of Rarotonga – the Federated 
States of Micronesia (FSM), the Marshall Islands, and Palau.  These states are not part of 
the Treaty because of their special security relationships as Freely Associated States 
under their Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with the US.  For example, in the 
Palauan COFA, Title III, Article I, Section 312 states that: 
The Government of the United States has full authority and responsibility 
for security and defense matters in or relating to Palau…[and] the 
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Government of the United States may conduct within the lands, water and 
airspace of Palau the activities and operations necessary for the exercise of 
its authority and responsibility under this Title. 
 
But the US also addresses the anti-nuclear feelings of Palau by also including the 
following within the COFA: 
In the exercise in Palau of its authority and responsibility under this Title, 
the Government of the United States shall not use, test, store or dispose of 
nuclear, toxic chemical, gas or biological weapons intended for use in 
warfare and the Government of Palau assures the Government of the 
United States that in carrying out its security and defense responsibilities 
under this Title, the Government of the United States has the right to 
operate nuclear capable or nuclear propelled vessels and aircraft within the 
jurisdiction of Palau without either confirming or denying the presence or 
absence of such weapons within the jurisdiction of Palau. (Title III, Article 
II, Section 324) 
 
And, as mentioned above, the US once was involved in ANZUS, a security alliance with 
Australia and New Zealand which began falling apart when New Zealand passed its law 
to prohibit port visits by nuclear armed and nuclear powered ships.  The nature of the 
existing security relationships in the Pacific provides high support for hypothesis six. 
 
 
Nuclear Testing in the Pacific 
 
 
Hypothesis four is supported because, for the most part, there were no proliferation 
concerns at the time the Treaty was created.  Australia had flirted with the idea of 
acquiring a nuclear weapon, but had abandoned that plan (Walsh 1997).  The only real 
concern in the South Pacific was the issue of French testing, although the US had played 
a similar role with some major nuclear testing programs in the Pacific beginning in the 
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1940s.  Although the US stopped testing nuclear weapons in the Pacific in the early 
1960s, Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands continues to host the Ronald Reagan 
Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site.  France announced it would sign the Treaty in late 
1995, but continued its nuclear tests until its last at Fangataufa in January 1996. 
 
The list of nuclear testing sites for the United States included Bikini Atoll and Enewetak 
in the Marshall Islands, Kiritimati Island in Kiribati, and Johnston Atoll (Regnault 2005).  
The first atomic test in the Pacific was carried out by the US in 1946 at Bikini, the same 
year they had evacuated the Bikinians from their home (Katosang 1976).  This would be 
the first of 93 tests at Bikini from 1946 to 1958.  That includes the first test of a 
deliverable thermonuclear hydrogen bomb, the 15 megaton Castle Bravo, on 28 February 
1954 (Niedenthal 2001).  The severe fallout accident from the Bravo test led to an 
eventual evacuation of the neighboring islands of Rongelap, Rongerik, Utirik, and 
Ailinginae.  Kiritimati Islands and South Australia were testing sites for the United 
Kingdom and French testing sites were Moruroa and Fangataufa in French Polynesia 
(Regnault 2005).  This history of testing and the continued military presence in the region 
provides additional support for hypothesis six on strategic importance. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The following answers to the focus questions were addressed in this case: 
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1. What types of restrictions does the agreement place on NWS and what was 
the US response? 
Additional Protocols prohibit manufacturing, stationing, and testing.  They 
also provide negative security assurances which the US supported 
conditionally when signing. 
 
2. How is the region strategically important to the US? 
Formal security agreements exist with the freely associated states (FSM, 
Palau and the Marshall Islands) and at one time, with the ANZUS alliance.  
The COFA agreements address the nuclear issue.  The ANZUS alliance 
was broken with New Zealand because of the New Zealand transit laws 
concerning nuclear capable vessels. Also, the US did have a major testing 
program in the northern part of the region that is not covered by the 
SPNFZ and the US continues to test conventional weapons in the Marshall 
Islands. 
 
3. How did other NWS respond to the agreement? Did that affect the US 
response? 
The response of France had the greatest effect on the US.  The US also 
disagreed with the Soviet Union’s position on some provisions.  The Cold 
War was ending when the agreement was created, but the US continued to 
live under its shadow, balancing against the Soviet Union decision to 
support the Treaty.  The US and the UK decided to stand behind France’s 
extreme opposition to the Treaty. 
 
4. To what extent are there proliferation concerns within the region? 
No proliferation concerns in the region. 
 
5. How does the treaty interact with the timing of the NPT? 
Created 15 years after the NPT went into force, but the US, UK and 
France finally signed when the NPT was once again a major issue as it 
was being extended in the mid-1990s. 
 
6. Did the US have any influence in the creation of the treaty? 
Influenced by strong regional anti-nuclearism because of testing history.  
Indirect influence of the US through Australia on the transit issue. 
 
7. Which party controlled the presidency and the senate at the time of 
drafting, signing, and if applicable, ratification of the treaty? 
When the treaty was drafted, a Republican president (Reagan) was in 
office and there was a Republican majority in the Senate.  A Democratic 
president (Clinton) signed the agreement in 1996. 
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It appears that the most important hypotheses involved with the Rarotonga case are one, 
two, five, and six.  Restrictions seemed to be an important part of the problem, even 
though Australia tried to help with the transit issue so hypothesis five is supported.  
Hypothesis six fits, as the Pacific has been an important strategic area for the US, 
especially since the Second World War.  If the PIF ever wanted to extend the boundary of 
the zone into the North Pacific or if the northern states more forcefully pursued entry into 
the zone, it could create problems for US security interests. Also, this hypothesis is 
supported through the example of the dissolving of the ANZUS alliance and trying to fit 
nuclear issues into the COFA agreements.  The first hypothesis was probably the most 
important, because in this case, the US was less likely to support the SPNFZ within the 
bipolar structure of the 1980s because they were balancing against the Soviet Union who 
chose to support the agreement, and attempted to stay on the side of their western ally, 
France, who absolutely refused to sign the Treaty because of their nuclear testing 
program in the Pacific.  Table 7 provides a summary of which hypotheses are supported 
and what evidence there is to support them.  Though strategic interests were highly 
supported, for this Treaty, it seems the most important factor was that of Soviet support 
and strong French opposition to the creation of the SPNFZ. 
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Table 7. Hypothesis Summary Table: Rarotonga 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Evidence 
Level of 
Support 
1. The international system structure and 
balancing behavior during the Cold War 
has an effect on how the US responds to 
NWFZ agreements that exists both during 
and after the Cold War era. 
The Soviet Union offered early support. 
The US backed their western ally, France. Medium 
2. If a NWFZ agreement is created when 
the NPT is being negotiated (or renewed), 
then the US is more likely to support it. 
The US did not sign the Treaty when it 
was created, but did choose to sign when 
the NPT was being extended. 
Medium 
3. If the US is involved in the creation of 
the treaty, then they are more likely to 
support it. 
Indirectly influenced the transit issue 
through the help of Australia. Medium 
4. The US is more likely to support a 
NWFZ if there are proliferation threats in 
the region. 
No proliferation threats. Medium 
5. The more the US is restricted by the 
provisions of an agreement, the less likely 
they are to support it. 
Transit issue could be a potential problem 
but negative security was accepted. 
Medium-
High 
6. If the region is strategically important, 
for example, if the US would not be able to 
fulfill its duties under existing bilateral or 
multilateral security agreements because 
of their nuclear policies, then they are less 
likely to support the NWFZ treaty. 
ANZUS crisis.  
Associated states have nuclear agreements 
within the COFAs. 
Nuclear testing program in some areas. 
Military presence continues. 
High 
7. Democrats are more likely than 
Republicans to support these agreements. Signed by Democratic President Medium 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
PELINDABA 
 
The Pelindaba Treaty, which established a NWFZ in Africa, has taken almost half a 
century to become fully developed after the United Nations and the Organization of 
African Unity expressed interest in the denuclearization of the continent (OAU 1964).  
Although African states and the international community as a whole generally support 
efforts at strengthening the nonproliferation regime, some obstacles have been thrown 
into the mix.  One of the most crippling of these obstacles to the African NWFZ has been 
the secret pursuit and development of nuclear weapons by a select group of African 
states. 
 
The creation of the African NWFZ has been an international effort as well as a regional 
effort.  Just like the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Pelindaba Treaty acknowledges a number of 
resolutions which were passed in international and regional bodies such as the United 
Nations General Assembly, the Organization of African Unity Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government, and the OAU Council of Ministers.  In 1961 the UN General 
Assembly passed Resolution 1652 (XVI) which addressed the issue of African 
denuclearization.  This Resolution expressed concern over the biological effects of 
  
 55
radioactive fallout from nuclear testing and over the prospect of Africa getting caught up 
in the US-Soviet arms race, and requests that member states consider Africa as a 
denuclearized zone.  The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government then 
followed in 1964 with the “Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa,” also referred 
to as the Cairo Declaration.  In this declaration, the OAU member states declared their 
willingness to create an international treaty to ban the production or acquisition of 
nuclear weapons and requested that the NWS respect the declaration. 
 
In 1991 and 1992, the OAU Council of Ministers adopted CM/Resolution 1342 (LIV) 
and CM/Resolution 1395 (LVI) in which they “affirmed that the evolution of the 
international situation was conducive to the implementation of the Cairo Declaration” 
(UNODA 2009: np).  Finally in April 1996, three and a half decades after the UN 
requested to have Africa considered as a denuclearized zone, the Pelindaba Treaty 
establishing the African NWFZ was opened for signature.  It seems, though, that the US 
was not an influential actor in the creation of the Treaty.  Therefore, hypothesis three has 
low support. 
 
 
Benefits of an ANWFZ 
 
 
So what are some of the benefits that will be provided by a NWFZ in Africa?  
Ogunbanwo (2003) focused on four major issue areas that are identified in the treaty that 
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will be beneficial to Africa, and possibly the wider international community.  These four 
areas include negative security assurances, terrorism, economic development, and 
environmental protection.  The treaty’s built-in negative security assurances, identified by 
the UN as an obligation of the NWS, similar to the other two NWFZs discussed in this 
thesis, should in theory protect the states within the zone from nuclear attacks or threats 
by the NWS. 
 
The second issue identified by Ogunbanwo (2003) was that the treaty could help address 
the fears of nuclear terrorism, which have increased since the September 11 attacks and 
especially after the fabrication of the Iraqi attempt to acquire uranium from Niger.  Levi 
(2008: np) argued that “staging a nuclear attack is harder than most people think,” 
because terrorist groups have limited capabilities and “to pull off a nuclear attack, a 
group would need to acquire nuclear materials or a weapon, build a bomb or unlock an 
existing one, move that weapon to its target, and detonate it.”  Others are more 
pessimistic than Levi.  Allison (2004) argued that the development of new strategies is 
crucial, and proposed a strategy of preventing nuclear terrorism based on three no’s, 
which include no new nuclear states, no loose nukes, and no nascent nukes.  The creation 
of a NWFZ pretty much takes care of the first “no” and the second “no” is primarily 
centered on the security of the US and Russian nuclear arsenals which, according to 
Shultz et al. (2008), hold around 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons.  Allison 
(2004: np) claimed that “almost every month, someone somewhere is apprehended trying 
to smuggle or steal nuclear materials or weapons,” offering the example of Atomflot 
deputy director Alexander Tyulyakov being arrested for this in August 2003 in the 
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Russian port city of Murmansk.  Similarly, there is another example that illustrates the 
sometimes dodgy security of the US nuclear arsenal, that six nuclear armed cruise 
missiles were flown across the country on a US Air Force plane in late August 2007 and 
“for 36 hours, no one knew where the warheads were, or even that they were missing” 
(Shultz et al. 2008: np).  The third “no” is more relevant to Africa, as a source of raw 
nuclear material.  Ogunbanwo (2003) asserts that the treaty will provide greater 
cooperation and regulation of nuclear commerce.  The treaty seeks to make dual use of 
African nuclear materials impossible for non-nuclear weapons states, as Article 9 
prohibits “providing source or special fissionable material…for peaceful purposes to any 
non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement 
concluded with IAEA” (UNODA 2009).  As Allison (2004: np) so simply put it, 
preventing nuclear terrorism “is a basic matter of physics: without fissile material, you 
can’t have a nuclear bomb. No nuclear bomb, no nuclear terrorism.”  Since addressing 
terrorism is an important strategic issue for the US in Africa, the ANWFZ should 
complement that strategic interest.  So the US should be more likely to support the 
Treaty.  Although this would seem to offer support for hypothesis six, it does not work 
quite as well as the Rarotonga case.  Since the US did sign the Treaty when it was 
created, this provides medium support for hypothesis six. 
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Obstacles to an ANWFZ 
 
 
With so many major benefits, why did it take 35 years to develop the treaty after the first 
UN resolution and why, 13 years later, has it only just entered into force?  There seem to 
be three major obstacles that have, or will have, an impact on the development of the 
treaty.  An early obstacle was the development of secret nuclear weapons programs.  
Egypt pursued the idea of developing a nuclear weapons program and South Africa went 
further and managed to secretly acquire a small nuclear capability.  Both countries 
reversed their nuclear ambitions, by the early 1990s becoming strong advocates for the 
African NWFZ.  An additional layer to this early obstacle is the recent revelation of 
Libya’s secret pursuit of a nuclear capability which was also reversed and publicly 
disclosed in December 2003 (Braut-Hegghammer 2008).  The case of South Africa’s 
nuclear weapons program and subsequent rollback will be discussed in more detail later 
in the chapter.  A second obstacle, which I refer to as the current obstacle, is that “the 
ratification process has been disappointingly slow” (Ogunbanwo 2003: 132).  The 
ratification of the Pelindaba Treaty has been much slower than the other NWFZ treaties, 
which each entered into force within a few years of being opened for signature.  The 
Pelindaba Treaty was set to enter into force when it is ratified by 28 states, which it 
finally achieved in July 2009 (UNODA 2009).  Table 8 illustrates which African states 
are party to the Treaty of Pelindaba. 
 
 
 
 59
Table 8. Parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba (UNODA 2009) 
State Signature Deposit 
Mauritius 11 April 1996 24 April 1996 
Gambia 11 April 1996 16 October 1996 
Algeria 11 April 1996 11 February 1998 
Mauritania 11 April 1996 24 February 1998 
South Africa 11 April 1996 27 March 1998 
Zimbabwe 11 April 1996 6 April 1998 
Tanzania 11 April 1996 19 June 1998 
Burkina Faso 11 April 1996 27 August 1998 
Botswana 9 June 1998 16 June 1999 
Mali 11 April 1996 22 July 1999 
Côte d’Ivoire 11 April 1996 28 July 1999 
Guinea 11 April 1996 21 January 2000 
Swaziland 11 April 1996 17 July 2000 
Togo 11 April 1996 18 July 2000 
Kenya 11 April 1996 9 January 2001 
Nigeria 11 April 1996 18 June 2001 
Lesotho 11 April 1996 14 March 2002 
Equatorial Guinea -- 19 February 2003 
Madagascar -- 23 December 2003 
Libya 11 April 1996 11 May 2005 
Senegal 11 April 1996 25 October 2006 
Rwanda 11 April 1996 1 February 2007 
Gabon 11 April 1996 12 June 2007 
Benin 11 April 1996 4 September 2007 
Ethiopia 11 April 1996 13 March 2008 
Mozambique 11 April 1996 26 March 2008 
Malawi 11 April 1996 23 April 2009 
Burundi 11 April 1996 15 July 2009 
Angola 11 April 1996  
Cameroon 11 April 1996  
Cape Verde 11 April 1996  
Central African Republic 11 April 1996  
Chad 11 April 1996  
Comoros 11 April 1996  
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 11 April 1996  
Djibouti 11 April 1996  
Egypt 11 April 1996  
Eritrea 11 April 1996  
Ghana 11 April 1996  
Guinea-Bissau 11 April 1996  
Liberia 11 April 1996  
Morocco 11 April 1996  
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State Signature Deposit 
Namibia 11 April 1996  
Niger 11 April 1996  
Sierra Leone 11 April 1996  
Sudan 11 April 1996  
Tunisia 11 April 1996  
Uganda 11 April 1996  
Zambia 11 April 1996  
Sao Tome and Principe 9 July 1996  
Seychelles 9 July 1996  
Liberia 9 July 1996  
Congo 27 January 1997  
Somalia 23 February 2006  
  
Ogunbanwo (2003) suggests that the extremely slow march to ratification is a result of 
three particular factors.  First among these factors is that historically, the treaty 
ratification process among African states has generally been slow.  The second factor is 
that other priorities, such as civil conflicts, have drawn states’ attention elsewhere.  And 
finally, he suggests that the delay is partially due to the “inadequate role played by the 
OAU” as the depository of the treaty and hopes that the AU will be more effective in 
promoting the ratification of the treaty (Ogunbanwo 2003: 135).  The third obstacle, 
which most closely relates to my study on how the US responds to the Treaty, could 
become the “future obstacle” to the effectiveness of an African NWFZ – the mixed 
responses and reservations of the NWS. 
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Additional Protocols and NWS Responses 
 
 
The restrictions on NWS are similar to the other Treaties, although not quite as strict as 
those within the Treaty of Rarotonga.  For the Treaty of Pelindaba, there are three 
additional protocols directed at external state actors as part of the treaty (UNODA 2009).  
The first two additional protocols are open to the five NWS for signature.  Protocol I 
prohibits the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty or 
territories included in Protocol III, so this is the mechanism in which the NWS can meet 
their obligations of negative security assurances described above.  Protocol II prohibits 
NWS from testing nuclear weapons within the zone.  Protocol III applies the treaty to 
territories in which non-OAU states are de jure or de facto internationally responsible.  
This final protocol is open to France and Spain for signature. 
 
China, France, the United Kingdom, and the US signed the protocols open to them at the 
signing ceremony on 11 April 1996.  The support of France, the UK, and the US carried 
reservations, however.  French reservations and declarations included: that full exercise 
of the right to self-defense is not impaired, that transit of nuclear explosive devices 
(bound for other French territories outside the zone) be allowed through its territories 
within the zone, that the treaty does not modify passage through the Suez Canal, and that 
negative security assurances only apply to states which are party to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (UNODA 2009).  The statement included by the 
UK conveyed their support of efforts to prevent proliferation, however they also asserted 
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their sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory and rejected its inclusion within 
the zone.  The UK also declared that they would not be bound by Protocol I “in the case 
of an invasion or any other attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its 
armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security 
commitment, carried out or sustained by a party to the Treaty in association or alliance 
with a nuclear-weapon State…or if any party to the Treaty is in material breach of its 
own non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty” (UNODA 2009).  The US, which 
operates a military base on the island of Diego Garcia within the British Indian Ocean 
Territory, signed “with the reservation that no change would be required in its operations 
on Diego Garcia,” which is leased from the UK (Mtimkulu 1996: 11).  Hypothesis five is 
supported because the restrictions were at an acceptable level for the US to offer 
immediate support by signing the Treaty. 
 
Originally, Russia did not sign the Additional Protocols, although they were present at 
the signing ceremony, “apparently to show moral support” (Mtimkulu 1996: 11).  Russia 
did add its signature seven months later, on 5 November 1996, with reservations.  One 
reservation is very similar to the UK response to Protocol I about retaining the right to 
self-defense.  The other reservation referred back to the Diego Garcia issue: 
 
In accordance with the Article 1 of the Treaty ‘African Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zone’ means the territory of the continent of Africa, island States-
members of OAU and all islands considered by the Organization of 
African Unity in its resolutions to be part of Africa…[while] the military 
base of the nuclear State is situated on the Chagos archipelago islands they 
cannot be regarded [as] meeting the requirements put forward by the 
Treaty for the nuclear-weapon-free territories…[so] proceeding from this, 
the Russian Federation cannot consider itself to be bound by the 
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obligations under Protocol I in respect of the aforesaid territories. 
(UNODA 2009) 
 
Because of the division between the US and Russia over the Diego Garcia issue, 
hypothesis one is also highly supported in this case.  France ratified Protocols I, II, and 
III in September 1996.  China ratified Protocols I and II in October 1997.  The UK 
ratified Protocols I and II in March 2001.  The US and Russia have not yet ratified 
Protocols I and II.  Table 9 illustrates which of the NWS have signed and deposited 
instruments of ratification for the Additional Protocols open to them. 
 
 
Table 9. NWS and the Additional Protocols (UNODA 2009) 
 Protocol I Protocol II 
State Signature Deposit Signature Deposit 
Russia 5 Nov 1996  5 Nov 1996  
China 11 Apr 1996 10 Oct 1997 11 Apr 1996 10 Oct 1997 
France 11 Apr 1996 20 Sep 1996 11 Apr 1996 20 Sep 1996 
UK 11 Apr 1996 19 Mar 2001 11 Apr 1996 19 Mar 2001 
US 11 Apr 1996  11 Apr 1996  
Spain n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Protocol III 
State Signature Deposit 
Russia n/a n/a 
China n/a n/a 
France 11 Apr 1996 20 Sep 1996 
UK n/a n/a 
US n/a n/a 
Spain   
 
Referring back to Table 5 in the previous chapter, it is noticeable that the Pelindaba 
Treaty was signed by the US, the UK and France less than a month after they signed the 
Treaty of Rarotonga.  Therefore, this Treaty was also created and signed while the NPT 
was still an important global issue. So, hypothesis two has medium support. 
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Proliferation Concerns 
 
 
The details of proliferation in Africa show how important and problematic the issue was 
at the time.  Major proliferation concerns have come from three states: Libya, Egypt, and 
South Africa.  Both Libya and Egypt attempted to pursue the development of nuclear 
weapons capabilities but reversed their preferences before acquiring the bomb.  Although 
both states, to a certain extent, wanted to counter the threat of a nuclear Israel, political 
identity was a more significant motivation in pursuing nuclear weapons and then to 
abandon that pursuit.  For Libya, joining the nuclear club would be a symbol of modern 
statehood because of the exclusivity of this club and also because at the time, nuclear 
weapons were a symbol of advanced technology and scientific knowledge (Braut-
Hegghammer 2008).  Issues that led to rollback in Libya include the cost of proliferation, 
its relationship with the US was becoming increasingly more positive, and they also 
became concerned about the prospect of nuclear terrorism (Braut-Hegghammer 2008).  In 
Egypt, nuclear weapons first became a status symbol which Nasser wished to pursue to 
fulfill his goal of leading the Arab world.  It was not until the Six Day War in 1967 that 
Nasser recognized Israel as the greater threat than his Arab rivals, although he had 
declared in 1960 that “if Israel acquired nuclear weapons, Egypt would certainly acquire 
them as well” (Rublee 2006: 557).  After this point, however, the program was stalled 
and Nasser signed the NPT shortly before his death in 1970.  His successor, Sadat, finally 
ended the nuclear program and advocated for nonproliferation in exchange for aid from 
the US after the war with Israel in 1973 (Rublee 2006). 
 65
South Africa successfully acquired a nuclear capability but gave it up to accede to the 
NPT.  A bit more is known about the South African program than is known about the 
Libyan and Egyptian programs.  The denuclearization norm established with the OAU’s 
Cairo Declaration in 1964 did not last long for the militarily strong, minority ruled South 
Africa.  Liberman (2001) illustrates that there were elements of the international security 
model and the domestic politics model in South Africa’s decision to proliferate.  The 
dominance of the military became one of the organizational, or bureaucratic, conditions 
that led to proliferation.  On the other hand, there were also nuclear and conventional 
security threats present in the region – the Soviet supported Cuban troops in Angola and 
the African National Congress (Liberman 2001).  South Africa feared what was referred 
to as encirclement, which included those Cuban troops in Angola in addition to “the 
imminent independence of…Zimbabwe under an actively antiapartheid regime” (de 
Villiers, Jardine and Reiss 1993: 101, Burgess 2006).  This suggests that Pretoria’s policy 
preferences could be based on the international security model, but something else 
became the basis of their nuclear strategy.  They never even had any intentions to use the 
nuclear weapons for military purposes, and the military was not even involved in the 
early stages of the program (de Villiers, Jardine and Reiss 1993).  The strategy was 
completely political, as they recognized that first of all, they would have very few targets, 
and also that military use or the threat of military use would carry more disadvantages 
that it would benefits (Long and Grillot 2000). 
 
The more significant basis of Pretoria’s nuclear strategy was that they were becoming 
increasingly isolated from Western and Commonwealth nations (Long and Grillot 2000, 
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Burgess 2006).  So they developed a bombs in the basement or blackmail strategy, as 
they believed that the West, and most importantly the US, “was less likely to abandon 
[them if they] possessed a credible nuclear weapons potential” (Burgess 2006, Long and 
Grillot 2000: 28).  The South African nuclear blackmail strategy consisted of three phases 
(de Villiers, Jardine and Reiss 1993, Long and Grillot 2000).  The first phase was referred 
to as strategic ambiguity, in which they would neither confirm nor deny their nuclear 
capability.  In the second phase, if faced with a military threat, they would covertly reveal 
their capability, most likely to the US.  Phase three consisted of public disclosure of the 
nuclear arsenal through official acknowledgement or an underground test.  In the end, 
they had never passed the first phase.  So this preoccupation with binding themselves to 
the West illustrates that their preferences were more strongly based on projecting a 
particular identity to important external actors and not on the security issues they faced in 
the region. 
 
Before producing fissionable material, an underground test site was built at the Vastrap 
Range in the Kalahari Desert for a cold test of the device’s non-nuclear components.  
However, it was abandoned due to international pressure after a Soviet satellite 
discovered the site in 1977 and soon after was confirmed by the US (de Villiers, Jardine 
and Reiss 1993).  Although Pretoria has denied ever testing its nuclear devices, there is 
some evidence to the contrary, which for the most part is centered on their alleged 
collaboration with Israel.  The most controversial of these allegations is referred to as the 
Vela Incident, in which a US Vela satellite detected a double flash in the South Atlantic 
off the southern coast of South Africa in September 1979 (de Villiers, Jardine and Reiss 
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1993, Liberman 2004).  The exact source of the double flash was suspected to be a joint 
Israeli/South African test of a low-yield nuclear device, although the Carter 
Administration determined that a possible source of the flash could have been a meteor 
striking the satellite (de Villiers, Jardine and Reiss 1993). 
 
Other aspects of the South African nuclear program are more transparent.  The Pelindaba 
nuclear research and storage facility, and the Y-Plant, a uranium enrichment plant built 
nearby at Valindaba were the central elements to South Africa’s nuclear program.  The 
Y-Plant produced its first HEU in early 1978 and the first fully assembled nuclear device 
was completed in1979, which was intended to be used in an underground test (de Villiers, 
Jardine and Reiss 1993).  An additional six devices were planned for a total of seven, 
though the seventh had not been completed when the program was terminated.  The 
devices were estimated to yield between 10 and 18 kilotons, the largest of which would 
have been slightly smaller than the US Trinity bomb. 
 
By the end of the 1980s, Pretoria began to question the strategic benefits of continuing its 
nuclear blackmail strategy.  Regional security threats were vanishing with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union – Cuban troops withdrew from a now less violent Angola and Namibia 
became independent (de Villiers, Jardine and Reiss 1993).  Even more influential was 
that their economic and political isolation was becoming worse.  The global norm of 
nonproliferation became overshadowed by the growing norm of rejecting South Africa’s 
apartheid regime.  Sanctions were contributing to the state’s isolation and influenced a 
normative shift, as Klotz (1995a: np) explained that “economic and cultural dimensions 
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of international pressure against South Africa had important, and generally, 
underestimated consequences for both the ruling National Party and its critics.” 
 
When F.W. de Klerk was elected in September 1989, his plans for reform included 
ending both apartheid and the nuclear weapons program, in pursuit of “a program of 
political reform to normalize South Africa’s international relations” (de Villiers, Jardine 
and Reiss 1993: 103).  The state had recognized that their nuclear strategy had become 
more of a burden than a benefit and sought to use accession to the NPT to improve its 
relationship with Washington and the rest of the international community.  The Y-Plant 
was closed in February 1990 and dismantlement began in July 1990 and completed by 
July 1991, not long before South Africa joined the NPT on 10 July 1991.  On 24 March 
1993, de Klerk publicly confirmed that South Africa had secretly built and dismantled the 
nuclear weapons and the IAEA subsequently confirmed complete disarmament in August 
1994 (Burgess 2006).  So, once again preoccupied with its relationship with the US and 
the West, a normative shift led to the reversal of the state’s earlier policies.  This 
illustrates that there was a major proliferation concern within the region, and since the US 
offered initial support for the ANWFZ, hypothesis four has mixed medium-high support. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This final case provided the following answers to the focus questions: 
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1. What types of restrictions does the agreement place on NWS and what was 
the US response? 
Additional Protocols prohibit testing and provide negative security 
assurances. Similar response as previous two cases. 
 
2. How is the region strategically important to the US? 
The terrorism issue is important and the use of Diego Garcia as a military 
base is an important strategic position. 
 
3. How did other NWS respond to the agreement? Did that affect the US 
response? 
Russia’s opposition to the exclusion of Diego Garcia still keeps Russia 
from ratifying the Treaty.  The US and the UK signed on the condition 
that Diego Garcia would be excluded from the zone. 
 
4. To what extent are there proliferation concerns within the region? 
Major proliferation concerns due to the past nuclear pursuit by Egypt, 
Libya and South Africa.  Some proliferation concerns also come from the 
fear of nuclear terrorism. 
 
5. How does the treaty interact with the timing of the NPT? 
The Treaty was created while the NPT was being extended, so it was once 
again a major global issue. 
 
6. Did the US have any influence in the creation of the treaty? 
African denuclearization has been advocated by the OAU (now the AU) 
since 1964.  No US influence. 
 
7. Which party controlled the presidency and the senate at the time of 
drafting, signing, and if applicable, ratification of the treaty? 
When the Pelindaba Treaty was drafted in April 1996, it was signed by a 
Democratic president (Clinton) and Republicans controlled the Senate at 
the time.  
 
 
For the Pelindaba Treaty, the most important hypotheses were one, two, four, five, and 
six.  The first hypothesis seemed to fit, because although the Cold War was over, there 
was still some tension between Russia and the US.  That tension was enough for Russia 
to take issue with the exclusion of Diego Garcia from the zone.  Hypothesis two is 
supported because of the proximity of the creation of the Treaty to the extension of the 
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NPT.  Since there were some major proliferation concerns within the region, hypothesis 
six is supported.  Hypothesis five is supported because Pelindaba is much less restrictive 
than Rarotonga and the US signed its support of the Treaty right away.  Hypothesis six is 
supported, but in a slightly different way than it was with Rarotonga.  Parts of Africa are 
considered strategically important to combat terrorism, and with the rising fears of 
nuclear terrorism, it makes sense that the US would support greater nuclear restrictions in 
Africa.  Table 10 provides a summary of these hypotheses and the evidence to support 
them.  I think for this case, the most important explanations would be the tension between 
Russia and the US over the US strategic position at Diego Garcia and the concerns of 
proliferation and terrorism. 
 
Table 10. Hypothesis Summary Table: Pelindaba 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Evidence 
Level of 
Support 
1. The international system structure and 
balancing behavior during the Cold War 
has an effect on how the US responds to 
NWFZ agreements that exists both during 
and after the Cold War era. 
Russia and the US are still divided over the 
Diego Garcia issue and transit issues. High 
2. If a NWFZ agreement is created when 
the NPT is being negotiated (or renewed), 
then the US is more likely to support it. 
The Treaty was created along with the 
extension of the NPT. Medium 
3. If the US is involved in the creation of 
the treaty, then they are more likely to 
support it. 
The US was not involved in the creation of 
the Treaty. Low 
4. The US is more likely to support a 
NWFZ if there are proliferation threats in 
the region. 
Major proliferation concerns. Medium-High 
5. The more the US is restricted by the 
provisions of an agreement, the less likely 
they are to support it. 
The Pelindaba Treaty is less restrictive 
than the Treaty of Rarotonga. Medium 
6. If the region is strategically important, 
for example, if the US would not be able to 
fulfill its duties under existing bilateral or 
multilateral security agreements because 
of their nuclear policies, then they are less 
likely to support the NWFZ treaty. 
Terrorism and nuclear terrorism are an 
issue. Diego Garcia is an important 
strategic position. 
Medium 
7. Democrats are more likely than 
Republicans to support these agreements. Signed by Democratic President. Medium 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Almost 65 years after the Trinity test, the states of the Southern Hemisphere have nearly 
banned nuclear weapons from their part of the world by cooperating through security 
regimes.  However, states with nuclear capabilities have not always been fully supportive 
of these regimes, as only one of the five regional NWFZ agreements carries signatures 
and ratifications of all the NWS.  The seven criteria the US uses to evaluate these 
agreements is obviously not enough for the US to actually support them, even though the 
conditions based on that list did, for the most part, work to predict the US responses as I 
expected. 
 
Overall, the hypotheses with the highest support were one and four.  Hypothesis one was 
important because for each of the treaties, there seemed to be some sort of clash or 
balancing act between the US and the Soviet Union/Russia, regardless of whether or not 
the Cold War was still in existence.  In Latin America, they disagreed over transport 
issues.  In the South Pacific, they were divided by France’s decision.  In Africa they 
disagreed over how the island of Diego Garcia should fit into the context of the NWFZ.  
The existence of a proliferation threat in the region also affected how the US responded 
(hypothesis four).  In Latin America, the threat came from the Cuban Missile Crisis and 
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in Africa one of the states succeeded in secretly acquiring a small nuclear arsenal.  Each 
of the other hypotheses had an overall “medium” score.  The NPT regime may also be an 
important factor in the US response to these NWFZ agreements, which is connected to 
hypothesis two.  It seemed as though the US was more likely to support a NWFZ 
agreement if the NPT was a strong international issue at the time.  The Treaty of 
Tlatelolco was created nearly parallel to the creation of the NPT, and the US signed both 
the Treaty of Rarotonga and the Pelindaba Treaty on the heels of the extension of the 
NPT.  My other additions to the seven criteria, influence and party in power, were scored 
just as high as those hypotheses connected to the seven criteria.  The US only really had 
an influence on the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties, but still initially supported the 
Pelindaba Treaty.  So hypothesis three only had medium support.  Hypothesis five had 
medium support because for the most part, the US addressed and conditionally accepted 
restrictions placed on them by these NWFZs.  Hypothesis six only had a medium level of 
support because it really only had an impact on how the US responded to the South 
Pacific’s NFZ and to Africa’s NWFZ, due to their COFA agreements and their other 
security ties to certain Pacific Islands and their use of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. 
 
Finally, the treaties were more likely to be signed and ratified by Democrats, but there 
was the one outlying example of Protocol I of Tlatelolco where a Republican Senate 
ratified the treaty which did not follow with my expected outcome.  So hypothesis seven 
was supported, but I believe that a deeper examination of this issue would be very helpful 
in strengthening this study.  Table 11 provides a final summary of which hypotheses were 
supported in each case and how much support each hypothesis has overall. 
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Table 11. Hypothesis Summary Table: Conclusion 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Tlatelolco 
 
Rarotonga 
 
Pelindaba 
Overall 
Support 
1. The international system 
structure and balancing behavior 
during the Cold War has an effect 
on how the US responds to NWFZ 
agreements that exists both during 
and after the Cold War era. 
High Medium High High 
2. If a NWFZ agreement is created 
when the NPT is being negotiated 
(or renewed), then the US is more 
likely to support it. 
Medium-High Medium Medium Medium 
3. If the US is involved in the 
creation of the treaty, then they are 
more likely to support it. 
High Medium Low Medium 
4. The US is more likely to support 
a NWFZ if there are proliferation 
threats in the region. 
High Medium Medium-High Medium-High 
5. The more the US is restricted by 
the provisions of an agreement, the 
less likely they are to support it. 
Medium Medium-High Medium Medium 
6. If the region is strategically 
important, for example, if the US 
would not be able to fulfill its 
duties under existing bilateral or 
multilateral security agreements 
because of their nuclear policies, 
then they are less likely to support 
the NWFZ treaty. 
Low High Medium Medium 
7. Democrats are more likely than 
Republicans to support these 
agreements. 
Medium-High Medium Medium Medium 
 
 
An important policy suggestion that can be concluded from this study is that the regions 
covered by these NWFZ agreements (and others that may follow) need to somehow find 
a way to obtain the approval of both the US and Russia so that their security regimes will 
be more effective.  By examining the efforts of the states in these three regions, it seems 
that cooperation is possible, but may be more successful on the regional level than the 
global level since some regions are having trouble getting some of the NWS to agree to 
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their Additional Protocols.  Though, the importance of the NPT suggests that an 
international regime must exist and be an important issue for smaller regional regimes to 
successfully seek out the support of major players.  It also seems to suggest that within 
security regimes, a major player’s response is heavily dependent on the responses of 
others in similar situations. 
 
These results are interesting, but I think there could be other explanations for why the US 
has inconsistently responded to NWFZ agreements.  Another way to look at this would 
be to examine, more closely than I have here, which parties controlled the Presidency and 
the Senate at the times in which these agreements were created and the position that each 
party may have taken in the decision whether or not to support or even consider 
supporting these treaties.  I only looked at the results of this factor, and not more in-depth 
at how the actual individuals and parties responded and debated from the point these 
treaties were drafted to the point that they were signed or ratified.  Other suggestions for 
further study could be to examine if and how much each of these treaties influences the 
next.  It would also be interesting to explore why the US has not signed other NWFZ 
agreements such as those created by the Treaty of Bangkok and the Semipalatinsk Treaty 
when more information becomes available regarding these agreements. 
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